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retailer can make higher profits and can also suffice with a smaller assortment size. This provides an
explanation for why traditional retailers, despite being small in size, have been able to survive in many
emerging markets. In the second essay, I focus on manufacturer strategies and profit sharing upstream in
the channel. I find that mediated access can provide a certain bargaining power to retailers over
manufacturers, further explaining their resilience in emerging markets. This dissertation work builds a
theory of selling formats in retailing and has important implications for both modern and traditional
retailers as well as policy makers.
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ABSTRACT
SELLING FORMATS IN RETAILING IN DEVELOPED AND EMERGING
ECONOMIES
Abhinav Uppal
Jagmohan S. Raju
A couple of decades ago, modern retailers like Auchan, Costco and Walmart started
expanding to several emerging markets like India. It was widely presumed that the
entry of these large organized retailers would lead to the demise of traditional retailers
(small independent / family owned stores) that accounted for the vast majority of
retail sales in these markets. These assumptions, however, have proved wrong as
traditional retailers have proved remarkably resilient, continuing to thrive in many
emerging markets. In this dissertation, I investigate why this happened. I find that
part of the answer to this puzzle lies in the different selling formats being employed by
modern and traditional retailers. While modern retailers employ the “direct access”
selling format which is prevalent in the developed world, traditional retailers in many
emerging markets follow a “mediated access” selling format in which customers do not
have direct access to the products in the store. Instead, these retail stores are manned
by shopkeepers who offer products to customers one by one on demand. I find that the
mediated access selling format affords traditional retailers certain advantages, both
in their interactions with their customers as well as with manufacturers, which have
allowed them to thrive in emerging markets. Methodologically, I use game-theoretic
models to study different parts of the distribution channel. In the first essay, I model
a retailer’s interactions with its customers under the two selling formats. I find that
under mediated access, the retailer can make higher profits and can also suffice with
a smaller assortment size. This provides an explanation for why traditional retailers,
despite being small in size, have been able to survive in many emerging markets. In
the second essay, I focus on manufacturer strategies and profit sharing upstream in
the channel. I find that mediated access can provide a certain bargaining power to
retailers over manufacturers, further explaining their resilience in emerging markets.
This dissertation work builds a theory of selling formats in retailing and has important
implications for both modern and traditional retailers as well as policy makers.

iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

iii

ABSTRACT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

iv

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

vi

CHAPTER 1 : Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1

CHAPTER 2 : Litrature Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

8

CHAPTER 3 : Consumer Retailer Interactions
Selling Formats . . . . . . . .
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.2 Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.3 Analysis and Results . . . . . . . . . .
3.4 Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.5 Conclusions and Discussion . . . . . .

in Mediated vs Direct Access
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

11
11
19
22
39
49

CHAPTER 4 : Manufacturer Strategies and Channel Interactions in Mediated
vs Direct Access Selling Formats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4.2 Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4.3 Analysis and Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4.4 Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4.5 Conclusions and Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

53
53
56
59
70
76

CHAPTER 5 : Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

79

BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

85

v

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS
FIGURE 1 :

Modeling selling formats and their effect on different parts
of the retail channel. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

FIGURE 2 :

5

Selling formats in equilibrium plotted with the retail price of
the general purpose brand pG and the uncertainty associated
with the specialized brand β (for F = 0.03, c = 0.045 and
t = 1). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

FIGURE 3 :

34

Retailer’s total profit ΠR and retail price for the specialized
brand pS plotted with the uncertainty associated with the
specialized brand (equilibrium profits are drawn in black)
(for pG = 0.5, F = 0.03, c = 0.045 and t = 1). . . . . . . . .

FIGURE 4 :

35

Selling formats in equilibrium plotted with consumers’ shopping cost c and the direct access format fixed cost F (for
t = 1, pG = 0.75 and β = 0.75). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

FIGURE 5 :

36

Retailer’s profit plotted with consumer’s shopping cost for
different levels of the price of the general purpose brand (for
β = 0.75, t = 1 and F = 0.02). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

FIGURE 6 :

Consumer surplus and total surplus plotted with consumer’s
shopping cost (for β = 0.75, pG = 0.75, t = 1 and F = 0.02).

FIGURE 7 :

37

38

Selling formats in equilibrium under asymmetric wholesale
prices (for t = 1, pG = 1/3 and wS = 1/8). . . . . . . . . . .

vi

42

FIGURE 8 :

Retail price of the specialized brand, retailer’s profit, consumer surplus and total surplus plotted with the margin on
the general purpose brand (for b = 3/4, pG = 3/4, t = 1,
c = 1/8, wS = 1/8 and F = 0.06). . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

FIGURE 9 :

43

Selling formats in equilibrium under endogenous pricing of
the general purpose brand plotted with the fixed cost of setting up a direct access store F and the uncertainty associated
with the specialized brand β (for c = 0.035 and t = 1). . . .

47

FIGURE 10 : Retail price for the general purpose brand pG plotted with
the uncertainty associated with the specialized brand β (for
F = 0.03, c = 0.045 and t = 1). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

48

FIGURE 11 : Selling Formats and Product Variety in Equilibrium plotted
with retailer’s level of influence over product demands γ, and
the substitutability between the two products θ (for c = 0.02). 68
FIGURE 12 : Manufacturer’s profit πM , retailer’s profit πR and total demand plotted in equilibrium with γ and θ (for c = 0.02, θ =
0.2 and c = 0.01, γ = 0.44 respectively). . . . . . . . . . . .

69

FIGURE 13 : Selling Formats and Product Variety in Equilibrium with
asymmetric products plotted with retailer’s level of influence
over product demands γ, and the substitutability between
the two products θ (for c = 0.02 and β = 1.05). . . . . . . .

vii

74

CHAPTER 1 : Introduction
Retailing is one of the largest and most important sectors of any economy. Total retail
sales in the US amounted to about $5.5 trillion in 2016, accounting for more than a
quarter of its GDP. In emerging economies like China and India, they amounted to
about $4.8 trillion and $980 billion respectively, accounting for about 40% of their respective GDPs. Given that developed and emerging economies account for about 40%
and 60% of world GDP (in PPP terms), respectively, it is important to understand
retailing in a global context.1
The present-day retailing landscapes in developed and emerging economies differ substantially. In developed economies, modern forms of retailing like supermarkets,
hypermarkets and retail chains, often run by large organized firms (e.g., Walmart,
Macy’s, Home Depot, etc.), are predominant, accounting for more than 80% of the
revenue share in high income countries (Bronnenberg and Ellickson 2015).
In emerging economies like India, on the other hand, retailing has historically been
dominated by traditional forms of retailing comprising of small, unorganized, independent or family owned stores and informal merchants. However, in the past couple
of decades, a number of large organized retailers like Auchan, Carrefour, Costco, and
Walmart have entered these emerging markets, introducing modern forms of retailing like supermarkets, hypermarkets and retail chains, in the hopes of tapping the
huge growth potential available in these economies. These modern forms of retailing
have also grown organically within these markets, with large indigenous firms opening
retail chains domestically.
1

These numbers are collected from Kohli and Bhagwati 2012, US Census Bureau Retail Trade
Report 2017, eMarketer 2016, China Daily 2017, IMF World Economic Outlook Database 2016.
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It was widely presumed that the entry of these large organized retailers would lead to
the demise of traditional retailers in emerging markets. However, this prediction has
proved wrong; traditional retailing has proved remarkably resilient to the advent of
modern retailing in many of these markets. In fact, traditional retailers continue to
be the dominant channel in emerging markets like India, Indonesia and Philippines
accounting for more than 75% of grocery sales (Diaz et al. 2012, Bronnenberg and
Ellickson 2015). This resilience of traditional retailers in the face of competition
from larger organized retailers in these markets provides an exciting opportunity to
explore and understand the underlying differences between the two forms of retailing
and to help identify factors that might explain the endurance of traditional retailing
in emerging markets.
One of the interesting differences between modern and traditional forms of retailing lies in the different types of selling formats that they employ. Modern retailers
typically employ a selling format in which products are arranged on shelves in aisles
and are openly accessible to the customers, who are able to examine and compare all
available brands in a product category. In other words, the products are presented
simultaneously to the customers with retail prices marked clearly. Store associates,
who are few in number, typically play only a small role in a customer’s product
evaluation and choice process. I call this the “direct access” selling format.
Traditional retailers, on the other hand, typically employ a selling model in which
customers do not have direct access to products. Instead, a customer interacts with a
shopkeeper typically from across a counter at the front of the store with the products
stocked inside the store. The customer asks the shopkeeper for a product she wants,
the shopkeeper then goes to a shelf or to the back of the store to bring out the
product and states its price. By virtue of this procedure, given a customer’s category
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choice, the shopkeeper can influence the customer’s choice of brand. For instance, the
shopkeeper may strategically offer the customer a specific brand in the category that
the customer is interested in. However, if the customer does not like the brand that
is offered to her by the retailer, she might ask the shopkeeper to show an alternate
brand. In this way, the products are presented sequentially to the customer, the
order of which is often decided by the shopkeeper, who can also price the products
dynamically. I call this the “mediated access” selling format.
The two different selling formats present a number of interesting and previously unanswered research questions that I endeavor to answer in this dissertation. Under what
market conditions and consumer characteristics do retailers choose to follow direct
vs mediated access formats? What types of products should a retailer following the
mediated access format offer first to its customers? Retailers following the mediated
access format often carry a narrower product assortment. Why is this the case? How
should retailers price the products carried in each of the formats? How should manufacturer strategies be different across the two selling formats; how many products
should they offer and how should they price them? How does profit sharing within
the channel differ when the retailer follows mediated vs direct access formats? My
aim is to develop a theory of selling formats that sheds light onto these questions
with the overall aim of investigating the role of selling formats in the resilience of
traditional retailing in emerging markets.
In the first essay, I focus on understanding and modeling the interactions between
a retailer and its customers in direct vs mediated access selling formats (Figure 1).
To this end, I build a game-theoretic model in which a retailer makes selling format,
product assortment and pricing decisions, and consumers have shopping costs. There
are two products: a general purpose brand that provides the same utility uniformly
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to all consumers, and a specialized brand that gives ex ante uncertain utility to a
consumer that can be higher or lower than the utility of the general purpose brand,
and a consumer can resolve this by inspecting this brand.
I find that the retailer’s selling format decision is based on how costly it chooses
to make it for the consumer to determine her match with the specialized product,
i.e., whether it chooses to internalize the cost associated with this (by adopting the
direct access selling format) or transfers this cost to the consumer (by adopting the
mediated access selling format). This decision is, in turn, affected by consumers’
match uncertainty with the specialized brand. I find several interesting insights. For
instance, the retailer finds it optimal to adopt the mediated access selling format
when the uncertainty of match value with the specialized brand is either high or
low, and the direct access selling format when this uncertainty is medium. When
consumers’ match uncertainty with the specialized brand is high, the retailer offers
both brands sequentially, offering the specialized brand first. When this uncertainty
is medium, the retailer offers both brands simultaneously. When this uncertainty is
low, the retailer finds it optimal to reduce its product offering to only the general
purpose brand.
The model results, hence, show that mediated access can allow retailers to make higher
profits and also suffice with a smaller assortment size, providing an explanation for
why traditional retailers that employ the mediated access selling format have been
able to survive in emerging markets despite the advent of organized retailing in these
markets. I also derive results regarding consumers’ shopping costs and the retailer’s
fixed and marginal costs that offer insights into why the mediated access selling
format is more popular in emerging markets (as compared to developed markets)
where consumers’ shopping costs (e.g., cost of time) are typically small. At the same
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Essay 2:
Manufacturer
Strategies and
Channel Interactions
in Mediated vs
Direct Access
Selling Formats

Manufacturers

Retailers

Consumers

Essay 1:
Consumer Retailer
Interactions in
Mediated vs
Direct Access
Selling Formats

Figure 1: Modeling selling formats and their effect on different parts of the retail
channel.
time, in these markets, this format is less popular for large, organized retailers (as
compared to small, unorganized retailers) that may be able to obtain better trading
terms, e.g., larger retail margins, from upstream sellers.
In the second essay, I focus on upstream effects of direct vs mediated access selling
formats on manufacturer strategies and profit sharing within the channel (Figure 1).
To this end, I abstract away from the interactions between a retailer and its customers
by formulating specific demand functions that capture the ability of traditional retailers (following the mediated access selling format) to increase the demand of certain
products in a category by selectively recommending them to their customers. Traditional retailers can further invest in this ability by building better relationships with
their customers while modern retailers that follow the direct access selling format do
not have this ability.
I build a game theoretic model in which a manufacturer that has the ability to offer
up to two horizontally differentiated products decides how many products to offer
and at what wholesale prices; while a retailer decides how many products to carry,
5

at what retail prices and which product to recommend to its customers. The retailer
also decides which selling format to follow, and, if it decides to follow the mediated
access selling format, how much it should invest in its ability to selectively push the
demand for the product it recommends to its customers.
I find that product variety and the retailer’s chosen selling format in equilibrium depend on the level of influence the retailer has on product demands when selectively
recommending them to consumers. The retailer finds it optimal to adopt the mediated access selling format when its ability to selectively push the demand of certain
products is either low or high. When this ability is medium, the retailer adopts the
direct access selling format. Counterintuitively, the manufacturer reduces the product variety, offering only a single product, when the retailer’s ability to selectively
push the demand of certain products is high. It offers full product variety when the
retailer’s ability is low or medium.
This happens because the mediated access retailer’s ability to selectively push product
demands and its ability to decide which of the two products to push to consumers
gives it some bargaining power over the manufacturer. This allows the retailer to fully
extract the extra surplus generated in the channel by its ability. When this ability
is low, the manufacturer offers full product variety. Otherwise, the manufacturer
handicaps the mediated access retailer by reducing its product variety in order to
share the extra surplus generated in the channel by the retailer’s ability. As a result,
the retailer adopts the direct access selling format to ensure full product variety (and
hence increased total demand) when this ability is medium. In case this ability is
high, the retailer prefers to adopt the mediated access selling format even with a
reduced product offering and shares the extra surplus generated by its ability with
the manufacturer.
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These results provide another explanation for why traditional retailers, contrary to
widely made predictions, have been able to survive the advent of large organized
retailers in several emerging markets. Traditional retailers, by virtue of their mediated
access selling format, have some bargaining power over manufacturers upstream in
the channel which allows them to extract higher profits in certain cases. Hence, I
show that mediated access affords traditional retailers certain advantages in both
their interactions with consumers and manufacturers which provides an explanation
for their resilience in emerging markets.

7

CHAPTER 2 : Litrature Review
There is a small but growing amount of literature in the field of retailing in emerging
markets. Jerath et al. (2016) investigate the entry of modern retailing in a market
dominated by traditional retailers and find that the entry of an efficient modern
retailer leads to the exit of a number of traditional retailers from the market resulting
in a reduced overall competition in the market. Narayan et al. (2015) study early
stage adoption of modern retailing in emerging markets and find that consumers
in the upper and lower middle classes have a higher preference for modern forms
of retailing. Sudhir and Talukdar (2015) study IT adoption in the Indian retailing
sector and find that corruption and poor enforcement of tax laws motivates retailers
to avoid transparency by avoiding IT adoption at the cost of productivity. To the best
of my knowledge, this is the first attempt to theoretically model the sequential selling
format in a physical retailing context as compared to the direct access selling format,
to study its effect on different parts of the retail channel and to characterize the
scenarios under which each format is adopted explaining different adoption patterns
by traditional and modern forms of retailing that co-exist today in emerging markets.
Related to the first essay in this dissertation, Wernerfelt (1994a) considers the role of
sales assistance in retailing. The paper considers a situation where consumers cannot
determine their match with the available products themselves but sales associates can
infer consumers’ match and recommend products based on their inference. In this
dissertation, I consider product categories where consumers can determine the match
with available products themselves by examining the product (read labels, look at and
feel the product etc.). The role of shopkeepers in this setting is to decide whether to
offer a high or low ex-ante uncertainty product first to consumers and at what price.
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In addition, consumers can ask the retailer for one of the products directly if they
already know which product they wish to purchase.
A number of papers look at seller strategies when consumers incur evaluation costs
that are sunk prior to them making a purchase. Wernerfelt (1994b) and Lal and
Matutes(1994) discuss commitment devices, such as price advertisements and unconditional returns, for retailers to reassure consumers that they’d not exploit their sunk
evaluation costs. Villas-Boas (2009) discusses the use of product line length as a
commitment device for sellers to the extent of consumer surplus that is provided. In
the first essay of this dissertation, I consider consumer shopping costs that include
hassle costs and waiting time costs in the store as incurred in the mediated access
format (closely related to consumers’ opportunity cost of time considered in the context of haggling by Desai and Purohit (2004)) in addition to the transportation and
evaluation costs discussed in these papers.
There is a rich body of literature on consumer search in economics and marketing
(Diamond 1971, Weitzman 1979, Kuksov 2004, Armstrong et al. 2009). The literature considers consumers’ decision to choose from multiple options with uncertain
valuations and/or prices when searching for information on additional options is expensive. This is similar to how customers interact with a mediated access retailer in
the model in the first essay of this dissertation, but unlike standard search models,
the mediated access retailer in my model, observes its customer’s decision to “search”
further (ask for an alternative) or not while having some control over the sequence
of “search” (order of products being offered) and the ability to dynamically set the
retail price of the product being offered.
A significant body of literature in marketing has looked at channel structures and
their implications on marketing decisions (McGuire and Staelin 1983, Coughlan 1985,
9

Moorthy 1988). There is also a rich stream of literature that investigates marketing
actions that can help coordinate the distribution channel (Jeuland and Shugan 1983,
Moorthy 1987, Lal 1990, Gerstner and Hess 1995, Raju and Zhang 2005, and Dukes
and Liu 2010). In contrast to previous work on distribution channels, I study the
effect of a retailer’s selling format and its ability to choose which product to push to
consumers on product variety, prices and profit sharing in the channel.
A body of work in marketing studies consumer shopping behavior across and retailers’ choice between Every Day Low Price (EDLP) and High-Low Promotional Price
(HILO) formats (Lal and Rao 1997, Bell and Lattin 1998). The direct access vs
mediated access selling format choice for retailers studied in this dissertation work
is different from the retail price format choice studied in these papers which limit
themselves to the direct access selling format.
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CHAPTER 3 : Consumer Retailer Interactions in Mediated vs Direct
Access Selling Formats
3.1. Introduction
In this chapter, I develop a theory for different selling formats employed by retailers
globally, focusing on the different interactions between retailers and consumers across
the different types of selling formats. We discussed these selling formats in the introduction of this dissertation. I shall now discuss them in further detail, lay out how
I model the interactions between retailers and consumers, and help to explain why
certain formats are more popular in developed versus emerging economies.
In developed economies, retail stores are often run by large, organized retail store
chains (e.g., Walmart, Macy’s, Home Depot, etc.) and typically follow a model in
which products are arranged on shelves in aisles and are openly accessible to the
customers, who are able to examine and compare all available brands in a product
category. In other words, the products are presented simultaneously to the customers
with retail prices marked clearly. I call this the “direct access” selling format, and
this is found in almost all major retailers. In this format, store associates, who are
few in number, typically play only a small role in a customer’s product evaluation
and choice process.
In emerging economies, such as India, retailing has historically been dominated by
small, unorganized, independent or family owned stores and informal merchants.
These traditional retailers typically follow a selling model in which customers do
not have direct access to products. The customer interacts with a shopkeeper typically from across a counter at the front of the store with the products stocked inside
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the store. The customer asks the shopkeeper for a product she wants, the shopkeeper
then goes to a shelf or to the back of the store to bring out the product and states
its price. By virtue of this procedure, given a customer’s category choice, the shopkeeper can influence the customer’s choice of brand. For instance, the shopkeeper may
strategically offer the customer a specific brand in the category that the customer is
interested in. However, if the customer does not like the brand that is offered to her
by the retailer, she might ask the shopkeeper to show an alternate brand. In this way,
the products are presented sequentially to the customer, the order of which is often
decided by the shopkeeper, who can also price the products dynamically. I call this
the “mediated access” selling format.
The retailing landscape in these emerging markets has changed over the past couple of decades. A number of multinational companies including Auchan, Carrefour,
Costco, and Walmart have introduced modern forms of retailing like supermarkets,
hypermarkets and retail chains in these markets, in hope of tapping the huge growth
potential available in these economies. Large organized retailing firms have also grown
organically, with large indigenous firms opening retail chains domestically (and often
in partnership with a multinational entrant). These modern retailing firms typically
employ the direct access selling format. As a consequence, both mediated and direct
access selling formats coexist in significant measure in emerging markets today, via
the traditional and modern retailing channels (modern retailing accounts for about
40% of the revenue share in developing countries with the rest being accounted for
by traditional forms of retailing; Bronnenberg and Ellickson 2015, Diaz et al. 2012).2
The concurrent prevalence of the direct and mediated access selling formats presents
2

In developed markets, the direct access format dominates strongly, though mediated access has
some presence in small, independent stores or in certain categories like high end fashion products,
perfume, jewelry etc.

12

a number of interesting and previously unanswered research questions that I endeavor
to answer in this research. Why is there a predominance of direct access and mediated
access formats in organized and unorganized retailing, respectively? Can some key
underlying demand characteristics be identified that lead to these outcomes? In the
mediated access format, which types of products should the retailer present first to
consumers, a general purpose product or a specialized product? Unorganized retailers
often carry a narrower product assortment. Why is this the case? How should retailers
price the products carried in each of the formats? My aim is to develop a theory to
understand a retailer’s format choice, assortment and pricing decisions.
To this end, I build a game theory model in which a retailer has the option of selling
a general purpose brand and a specialized brand to consumers who have shopping
costs (e.g., hassle costs and waiting time costs in store). The general purpose brand
gives uniformly equal consumption utility to all consumers while the specialized brand
gives ex ante uncertain utility, which may be higher or lower than the utility of the
general purpose brand. Consumers can resolve this uncertainty by inspecting the
specialized brand in store. For instance, in the soap category, the general purpose
brand may be a standard unperfumed soap that all consumers like equally while the
specialized brand may be a soap with sandalwood essence that some consumers will
prefer more than the unperfumed one and others will prefer less. Similarly, in the
toothpaste category, the general purpose brand may be a standard toothpaste for
regular use while the specialized brand may be a toothpaste meant for sensitive gums
that appeals differently to different consumers. The retailer can choose to sell either
one or both of these brands and has to decide the prices and the store format as either
direct access or mediated access.
Under the direct access selling format, all carried brands are offered simultaneously
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whereas under the mediated access selling format, the brands are offered one at a
time to the consumers. Consumers can either let the retailer decide which product to
offer first or directly ask for a brand if they wish to do so. I abstract away from other
service related components of a mediated access selling format like providing credit
services, helping consumers determine their fit with the products or reducing pilferage.
By doing so, we are able to focus on the way products are offered differently across
the two formats (simultaneously vs sequentially) and show that mediated access can
be the more profitable selling format for retailers even without the benefits of added
service factors.
I find that the retailer’s format decision is based on how costly it chooses to make it
for a consumer to determine her match with the specialized product, that is, whether
it chooses to internalize the cost associated with this (by adopting the direct access
selling format) or transfers this cost to the consumer (by adopting the mediated access
selling format). This decision is, in turn, affected by consumers’ match uncertainty
with the specialized brand. The retailer chooses the mediated access selling format
when the uncertainty of match value with the specialized brand is either high or low,
and chooses the direct access selling format when this uncertainty is medium (as long
as the margin on the general purpose brand is not too high). The retailer prefers
to offer the specialized brand first under the mediated access selling format. This is
because by offering the specialized brand first, the retailer is able to resolve consumers’
match uncertainty with the specialized brand and, at the same time, take advantage of
their shopping costs to shift the demand towards the specialized brand which provides
a higher margin of profit for the retailer in equilibrium. However, the retailer is only
able to do so when consumers’ match uncertainty with the specialized brand is high.
Otherwise, consumers find it optimal to ask for the general purpose brand directly.
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As a result, the retailer chooses the mediated access selling format and offers the
specialized brand first only when this match uncertainty is high. When this match
uncertainty is medium, the retailer chooses to internalize consumers’ shopping costs by
adopting the direct access selling format instead, offering both brands simultaneously.
When this match uncertainty is low, the retailer again chooses the mediated access
selling format but reduces its product assortment, offering only the general purpose
brand.
In addition, the analysis allows us to explore the effects of different parameters on
the retailer’s profit, consumer surplus and total surplus, where we find a number
of surprising results. For instance, as consumers’ shopping costs increase, consumer
surplus and total surplus can increase. This happens because at a high shopping cost,
the retailer is no longer able to offer the specialized brand first when following the
mediated access selling format, making it profitable for it to internalize the consumers’
shopping cost by employing the direct access selling format. Another counterintuitive
result is that the retailer’s profit can decrease as the margin it makes on the general
purpose brand increases. I discuss these and other results in more detail when I
analyze the findings from the model.
The model results help explain a number of observations about the format choice of
retailers. For instance, in emerging markets we observe that large organized retailers
and retail chains typically employ the direct access format while small unorganized
retailers typically employ the mediated access format. This may be due to the fact
that large organized retailers are able to bargain for deeper discounts from manufacturers which small unorganized retailers may not be able to do; according to the
model, this will induce the former to choose the direct access format and the latter
the mediated access format. Furthermore, logistical and scale advantages enjoyed
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by organized retailers allow them to reduce the costs of setting up, maintaining and
running the stores in the direct access selling format; this, however, is expensive for
individuals and families explaining why they prefer to adopt the mediated access selling format instead. We also observe that the direct access format is more popular in
developed economies and in urban areas in emerging economies. This may be because
in developed economies and in urban areas in emerging economies customers’ shopping costs are larger which, according to the model, induces the retailers to prefer
the direct access format. The results from the model are also consistent with various observations about the different store formats, for instance, direct access stores
carry a larger assortments than mediated access stores, are cheaper and serve a larger
customer base.
The model results provide meaningful managerial implications for modern retailers
entering these emerging markets where consumers have low shopping costs. While
better trade terms and logistical advantages might make it beneficial for organized
retailers to adopt the direct access selling format, these retailers should consider
adopting the mediated access selling format for product categories that provide a
higher degree of uncertainty for consumers. We currently observe this in product
categories like shoes, perfumes etc. where organized retailers employ sales associates
that recommend products to consumers. While providing a better service might be the
driving force behind these decisions, the model results inform the retailer regarding
what type of brands they should offer first to consumers (specialized brands) and how
to price them. In addition, organized retailers should consider following mediated
access in other categories where consumers have a high uncertainty regarding their
match value with brands they are not familiar with.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 3.2, I lay out the model
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framework. In Section 3.3, I analyze the model, derive the results and discuss the
intuitions behind them. In Section 3.4, I consider extensions to the basic model to
show the robustness of the key insights and derive additional insights. In Section 3.5,
I conclude the chapter identifying limitations and areas for future research.
There is a small but growing amount of literature in the field of retailing in emerging
markets. Jerath et al. (2016) build a theoretical model to study the advent of modern
retailing in a market dominated by traditional retailers and find that the entry of an
efficient modern retailer leads to a number of traditional retailers exiting the market
such that overall competition in the market is potentially reduced, counterintuitively,
leading to a higher profit for the surviving traditional retailers. Narayan et al. (2015)
investigate early stage adoption of modern retailing in emerging markets and find
that preference for modern retail is greater amongs consumers in the upper and lower
middle classes. Sudhir and Talukdar (2015) examine the productivity transparency
trade-off in the Indian retailing sector and find that corruption and poor enforcement
of tax laws motivates retailers to avoid transparency by avoiding IT adoption at
the cost of productivity. To the best of my knowledge, this is the first attempt
to theoretically model the sequential selling format in a physical retailing context
as compared to the direct access selling format and to characterize the scenarios
under which each is adopted explaining different adoption patterns by traditional
and modern forms of retailing that co-exist today in emerging markets.
Related to this chapter, Wernerfelt (1994a) considers the role of sales assistance in
retailing. The paper considers a situation where consumers cannot determine their
match with the available products themselves but sales associates can infer consumers’
match and recommend products based on their inference. In this chapter, I consider
product categories where consumers can determine the match with available products
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themselves by examining the product (read labels, look at and feel the product etc.).
The role of shopkeepers in this setting is to decide whether to offer a high or low exante uncertainty product first to consumers and at what price. In addition, consumers
can ask the retailer for one of the products directly if they already know which product
they wish to purchase.
A number of papers look at seller strategies when consumers incur evaluation costs
that are sunk prior to them making a purchase. Wernerfelt (1994b) and Lal and
Matutes(1994) discuss commitment devices, such as price advertisements and unconditional returns, for retailers to reassure consumers that they’d not exploit their sunk
evaluation costs. Villas-Boas (2009) discusses the use of product line length as a
commitment device for sellers to the extent of consumer surplus that is provided. In
this model, I consider consumer shopping costs that include hassle costs and waiting
time costs in the store as incurred in the mediated access format (closely related to
consumers’ opportunity cost of time considered in the context of haggling by Desai
and Purohit (2004)) in addition to the transportation and evaluation costs discussed
in these papers.
There is a rich body of literature on consumer search in economics and marketing (Diamond 1971, Weitzman 1979, Kuksov 2004, Armstrong et al. 2009). The literature
considers consumers’ decision to choose from multiple options with uncertain valuations and/or prices when searching for information on additional options is expensive.
This is similar to how customers interact with a retailer following the mediated access
format in the model considered in this chapter but unlike standard search models, the
retailer following the mediated access format, in this model, observes its customer’s
decision to “search” further (ask for an alternative) or not while having some control
over the sequence of “search” (order of products being offered) and the ability to set
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the retail price of the products being offered based on this “search” sequence.
A body of work in marketing studies consumer shopping behavior across and retailers’ choice between Every Day Low Price (EDLP) and High-Low Promotional
Price (HILO) formats (Lal and Rao 1997, Bell and Lattin 1998, Galata, Bucklin and
Hanssens 1999). The direct access vs mediated access selling format choice for retailers studied in this dissertation work is different from the retail price format choice
studied in these papers which limit themselves to the direct access selling model.

3.2. Model
I model a single retailer that can carry either one or both of two brands in a product
category — a general purpose brand G and a specialized brand S. The general purpose brand is positioned to cater to all consumers alike, for example an unperfumed
soap or a regular toothpaste. Consumers are familiar with the characteristics of the
general purpose brand and all consumers derive the same utility U from consuming it. The specialized brand, on the other hand, is positioned to cater to specific
tastes, for example a soap with sandalwood essence or a toothpaste for sensitive gums.
Consumers are unfamiliar with the characteristics of the specialized brand and are
uncertain about the utility they derive from consuming it. I formulate this utility as
αi U where αi denotes the degree of match between the specialized brand and consumer i. This degree of match gets revealed to the consumer only when she gets to
examine the product (e.g., read its labels, look and feel it to determine their match,
etc.). I assume that αi is distributed uniformly between 1 − β and 1 + β where β
captures the amount of uncertainty associated with the specialized brand and has a
value between 0 and 1. Note that the ex-ante consumption utility of both brands is
the same and is given by U . In this sense, the specialized brand is not per se better
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or worse than the general purpose brand, rather it can provide more or less utility
than the general purpose brand to different consumers. To simplify the exposition of
the results, I shall normalize the base utility U to 1 in the analysis.
The retailer acts as a price taker for the general purpose brand, offering it at its prevailing retail price in the market pG , which is also known to the consumers. However,
since consumers are unfamiliar with the specialized brand and have a heterogeneous
match with it, the retailer is able to set its own retail price pS for it. To develop the
insights, I assume that the wholesale prices of the two brands are equal and zero in
the base model. In separate extensions, I allow the retailer to set the retail price of the
general purpose brand endogenously and for the wholesale prices to be asymmetric
and non zero and show that the key results continue to hold qualitatively.
The retailer can adopt one of two different selling formats to sell its products. First,
the retailer can follow a “direct access” selling format in which all brands being
carried by the retailer are arranged systematically on shelves to be accessed directly
by consumers. The consumers can inspect the brands themselves and find out their
match utility with the specialized brand (they already know their utility from the
general purpose brand). Second, the retailer can follow a “mediated access” selling
format in which all carried brands are stocked inside the store away from direct access
of consumers. The consumers, instead, interact with the retailer who fetches products
for them one at a time on demand. Consumers can either ask the retailer for one
of the brands directly or ask for the product category and let the retailer offer them
a brand of its choice. They can then either purchase the offered brand or ask the
retailer for another alternative, in which case the retailer offers the other brand to
them and they decide between the two offers. In this way, the brands are offered
sequentially to the consumers in the mediated access format as opposed to being
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offered simultaneously in the direct access format. Note that the direct access selling
format is almost uniformly used by organized retailers in developed and emerging
economies, and the mediated access selling format is typically used by unorganized
retailers in emerging economies. I shall use superscripts D and M to denote the direct
and mediated access selling formats, respectively.
In both formats, the retail price of the general purpose brand is fixed at pG , as
mentioned earlier. Under the direct access selling format, the retailer has to set the
retail price pS for the specialized brand (if it is carried) before the customers visit the
store. In contrast, in the mediated access format, the retailer can set the retail price
for the specialized brand at the time it is being offered (if it is offered). For both
formats, I assume that the retailer always carries the general purpose brand G and
has to decide whether to carry the specialized brand S in addition.
In the mediated access format, consumers incur a cost c > 0 when they ask the
retailer to show them a brand alternative to the one that they were offered first; this
can be thought of as a shopping cost that arises due to the waiting time in the store,
the hassle cost of dealing with the shopkeeper, etc. After asking for an alternative,
the consumers can purchase either of the two brands. However, in the direct access
format, since both brands are directly accessible to consumers, they are able to learn
about the specialized brand without incurring any extra waiting costs or hassle costs.
Note that this shopping cost c is separate from consumers’ cost of inspecting and
evaluating their fit with the specialized brand which I normalize to be zero, as it is
paid in both formats whenever a consumer inspects this brand.
I assume that the retailer incurs a fixed cost F > 0 for setting up the direct access
selling format but has a fixed cost normalized to zero for setting up the mediated
access selling format. The direct access format accrues a higher fixed cost because
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the retailer needs to set up a larger store with sufficient space for consumers to walk
around and inspect products, the products have to be placed in an aesthetic and
accessible manner on multiple shelves, etc. In contrast, in the mediated access format
the products are accessed only by the retailer and can be stocked more efficiently in
parts of the store that consumers never reach, so costs of total space needed, setting
up the store, periodic maintenance, etc., are lower.
Finally, I assume that the retailer serves a unit mass of consumers distributed uniformly between 0 and 1, with the retailer located at 0. A consumer located at x ∈ [0, 1]
incurs a transportation cost tx to visit the retailer, t > 0. This can be thought of
as another component of shopping cost, specifically, a cost of visiting the store or a
cost of taste mismatch with the store. I assume that a consumer’s degree of match
with the specialized brand is independent of her location. A consumer decides to visit
the retailer only if her expected utility from visiting the retailer is greater than her
outside option. I normalize the outside option to zero and assume that the consumer
visits the retailer if her expected utility is positive.

3.3. Analysis and Results
I analyze a three stage game. In Stage 1, the retailer decides its selling format. In
Stage 2, consumers based on their expected utility decide whether to visit the retailer
or not. In Stage 3, the retailer offers products according to the fixed selling format
and consumers decide which product to purchase. Stage 3 of the game is further
divided into substages depending upon the selling format chosen by the retailer. I
solve the game using backward induction, starting with Stage 3 first, to derive a
subgame perfect equilibrium.
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3.3.1. “Direct Access” Selling Format
Under the direct access selling format, the retailer displays all carried brands on
shelves directly accessible to the consumers. Consider the case when the retailer
carries both brands. Conditional on a consumer visiting the retailer, the timing of
the subgame is as follows:
• Stage 3a: The retailer decides the price for the specialized brand, pS .
• Stage 3b: The consumer decides which brand to purchase.
Consumer i receives a utility UGD = 1 − pG on purchasing G and USD = αi − pD
S on
purchasing S. Since the consumer can examine both brands on the shelf simultaneously, she knows her match with the specialized brand αi before making her purchase
decision. A consumer with match ᾱ = 1 − pG + pD
S is indifferent between purchasing
the general purpose brand or the specialized brand. Consumer i prefers purchasing
the general purpose brand G if αi < ᾱ and the specialized brand S otherwise. Since
αi is uniformly distributed between 1 − β and 1 + β, the probability of purchase for
G is given by

ᾱ−(1−β)
2β

and for S is given by

(1+β)−ᾱ
.
2β
D

(pD
S)



ᾱ−(1−β)
2β



=
The retailer’s expected profit per visiting consumer is given by π
pG +


(1+β)−ᾱ
D
pD
S . The retailer sets pS to maximize this expected profit per visiting con2β
sumer, such that,
β
,
2
β
π D = pG + .
8
pD
S = pG +

(3.1)
(3.2)

In case the retailer carries only the general purpose brand, the retailer’s profit per

23

visiting consumer is given by the margin on the general purpose brand, pG . Since the
retailer’s expected profit per visiting consumer from carrying both brands is greater
than what it makes from carrying only the general purpose brand (pG + β8 > pG ), the
retailer chooses to carry both brands in the direct access format. I summarize these
findings in Proposition 1.
Proposition 1. When following the direct access selling format, the retailer carries

both brands, offers the specialized brand at a higher retail price pG + β2 than the
retail price of the general purpose brand (pG ) and makes an expected profit of pG +

β
8

per visiting consumer.
The retailer prices the specialized brand higher than the general purpose brand. The
intuition behind this result is that the specialized brand provides a higher utility
(than the general purpose brand) to consumers that have a high match value with
the specialized brand. As a result, the retailer is able to extract more surplus from
these consumers by pricing the specialized brand higher than the general purpose
brand.
3.3.2. “Mediated Access” Selling Format
Under the mediated access selling format, consumers do not have direct access to
the brands being carried by the retailer, instead, they interact with the retailer who
fetches products for them one by one on demand. Conditional on a consumer visiting
the retailer, the timing of the game is as follows:
• Stage 3a: The consumer asks either for the product category or for one of the
brands directly.
• Stage 3b: If the consumer asks for the product category, the retailer decides
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which brand to offer first. The retailer then offers the decided / asked brand to
the consumer and sets the price if this brand is S.
• Stage 3c: The consumer decides whether to purchase the offered brand and end
the game or incur shopping cost c and ask for an alternative brand.
• Stage 3d: The retailer offers the other brand and decides the price if this brand
is S.
• Stage 3e: The consumer decides which of the two brands to purchase.
I use subscripts P 1 and P 2 to represent the two purchase opportunities and superscripts M G and M S to represent cases where the retailer offers the general purpose
brand G first and the specialized brand S first respectively. I first solve for the two
cases M G and M S and then study the consumer’s decision to ask for the product
category or for one of the brands directly.
Brand G First
Consider the case where the retailer offers the general purpose brand G first and the
specialized brand S second. Using backward induction, I start solving the game from
P 2. Note that, P 2 is reached conditional on the consumer asking for an alternative
brand in P 1, in which case the consumer incurs a shopping cost c and is offered
the specialized brand S. Upon inspecting S, the consumer’s match αi with the
brand gets revealed to her. The consumer then decides between receiving utility
MG
G
MG
U{P2,S}
= α i − pM
− c from purchasing S and U{P2,G}
= 1 − pG − c from purchasing
S

G (which was already offered in P 1). I assume that the consumer gets positive utility
from purchasing the general purpose brand in P 2 even after paying the shopping cost.
That is, the shopping cost is not too high, c < 1−pG . Consumers would then purchase
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G
G if their match with the specialized brand, αi , is less than ᾱ = 1 − pG + pM
and
S

they would purchase S otherwise. The retailer’s problem in P 2 can then be solved
G
analogously to the direct access case; the retailer sets pM
= pG + β/2 and makes an
S

expected profit πPM2G = pG + β/8 per visiting consumer.
In P 1, the consumer decides whether to purchase the offered general purpose brand
directly or ask for an alternative brand. Since the consumer does not know her match
with the specialized brand αi in P 1, she compares the utility from purchasing the
MG
= 1 − pG to the expected utility in P 2. The
general purpose brand directly, U{P1,G}

expected utility for a consumer in P 2 is given by,

E[UPM2G ]

Z

ᾱ

1
dα +
=
2β
1−β
β
= 1 − pG − c + .
16
MG
U{P2,G}
.

Z

1+β

ᾱ

MG
U{P2,S}
.

1
dα,
2β
(3.3)

MG
Comparing the two, it is evident that, E[UPM2G ] > U{P1,G}
when β > 16c. That is,

if the uncertainty associated with the specialized brand is high, consumers find it
optimal to ask the retailer for an alternative brand and then make their purchase
decision. As derived earlier, the retailer, in this case, makes an expected profit of
πPM2G = pG + β/8 per visiting consumer which is the same as in the direct access case.
Since this expected profit per visiting consumer is greater than what the retailer
would make by carrying only the general purpose brand (given by the margin on the
general purpose brand pG ), the retailer chooses to carry both the brands in this case.
On the other hand, if the uncertainty associated with the specialized brand is smaller
than this threshold β ≤ 16c, consumers find it optimal to purchase the general purpose
brand that is offered to them in the first period. The retailer, in that case, does not
carry the specialized brand and makes only the fixed margin from the general purpose
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brand, πPM1G = pG per visiting consumer. Summarizing, the profit for the retailer per
visiting consumer is given by,

πM G =




pG + β , if β > 16c
8


p G .

(3.4)

otherwise

Brand S First
We now study the case where the retailer offers the specialized brand S in P 1 and the
general purpose brand G in P 2. Since the consumer is offered the specialized brand
S
in P 1, her match with the brand αi and the price at which it is being offered pM
S

get revealed to her in P 1 as well. The consumer knows that the retailer carries the
general purpose brand and also knows its retail price, hence she has no uncertainty
about the offer in the P 2. Therefore, the consumer has all the information to make
her purchase decision in P 1 itself.
S
MS
or
= α i − pM
Consumer i can either purchase S in P 1 and receive utility U{P1,S}
S
MS
= 1 − pG − c. A
purchase G in P 2, incur shopping cost c and receive utility U{P2,G}
S
¯ = 1 − p G + pM
consumer with match value ᾱ
S − c is indifferent between purchasing S

in P 1 and purchasing G in P 2. Consumer i prefers purchasing the general purpose
¯ and the specialized brand otherwise. Since αi is uniformly distributed
brand if αi < ᾱ
between 1 − β and 1 + β, the probability of purchase for G is given by
for S is given by

¯
(1+β)−ᾱ
.
2β

¯ −(1−β)
ᾱ
2β

and

I assume that the shopping cost is small enough such that

the demand for G in the second period is non zero, c < 3β.
S
The retailer’s expected profit function per visiting consumer is given by π M S (pM
S ) =




¯ −(1−β)
¯
ᾱ
(1+β)−ᾱ
S
MS
p
+
pM
to maximize this expected profit
G
S . The retailer sets pS
2β
2β
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per visiting consumer, such that,
β+c
,
2
(β + c)2
= pG +
.
8β

S
= pG +
pM
S

(3.5)

πM S

(3.6)

I summarize the results in Proposition 2.
Proposition 2. When following the mediated access selling format,
• the retailer prefers to offer the specialized brand S first,
• when offering the specialized brand S first, the retailer offers S at retail price
pG +

β+c
2

which is higher than what it offers in the direct access format, and
2

per visiting consumer which is also higher compared
makes a profit of pG + (β+c)
8β
to when it is following the direct access selling format.
Proof. It is evident that (π D = πPM2G ) > πPM1G . Comparing π M S to π D , π M S − π D =
(β+c)2
8β

−

β
8

=

c(2β+c)
8β

> 0. Hence, π M S > (π D = πPM2G ) > πPM1G .

The intuition behind these results is that when the retailer offers the general purpose
brand first, given the uncertainty attached with the specialized brand, consumers are
more inclined to purchase the general purpose brand which generates a lower margin
of profit in the category for the retailer (the retailer prices the specialized brand higher
since some consumers have a higher utility from purchasing the specialized brand).
However, when the retailer offers the specialized brand first, consumers can resolve
their uncertainty about their utility from the specialized brand in the first purchase
opportunity itself. In addition, in this case, consumers have to incur a shopping
cost to purchase the general purpose brand. The combination of consumers’ reduced
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surplus from purchasing the general purpose brand and reduced uncertainty regarding
the specialized brand shifts demand towards the specialized brand which generates
a higher margin of profit for the retailer. This makes offering the specialized brand
first more profitable (per visiting consumer) than offering the general purpose brand
first and also more profitable (per visiting consumer) than following the direct access
format.
Note that the retailer might not be able to offer the specialized brand first if the consumer asks for the general purpose brand directly. I discuss the consumer’s decision
to ask for a product category vs a particular brand next. Also note that the total
profit of the retailer is determined by the expected profit per visiting consumer, the
overall demand and any incurred fixed costs. Hence, the direct access selling format
can still be more profitable than mediated access with specialized brand offered first
if it produces a higher overall demand for the retailer, as detailed in Section 3.3.3.
Consumers’ Product Category / Brand Request
We now study the consumers’ decision regarding whether to ask the retailer for one
of the brands directly or to ask for the product category and let the retailer decide
which brand to offer first. Since, as stated in Proposition 2, the retailer prefers to
offer the specialized brand first when asked for the product category, consumers are
indifferent between asking for the specialized brand first or for the product category.
Note that consumers might be unaware of the specialized brand being carried by
the retailer, e.g. in the soap category, the consumers might not know whether the
retailer is carrying a soap with sandalwood essence or an anti-bacterial soap. In this
case, asking the retailer for the product category serves as a proxy for asking for the
specialized brand first.
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Hence, consumers effectively decide between asking the retailer for the general purpose
brand G directly or letting the retailer offer the specialized brand S first. Note that
a consumer would decide to ask for the general purpose brand directly only with the
intention of purchasing it in the first purchase opportunity. Because otherwise, the
consumer must find it optimal to pay shopping cost c to learn about her match with
the specialized brand in P 2, in which case, she would rather let the retailer offer
the specialized brand in the first purchase opportunity and learn about her match
without paying the shopping cost.
Hence, consumers compare the expected utility from asking for and purchasing the
MG
= 1 − pG to the expected utility
general purpose brand G directly, given by U{P1,G}

from letting the retailer offer them the specialized brand S first, given by

E[U

MS

¯
ᾱ

Z 1+β
1
1
MS
U{P1,S}
dα +
.
dα,
]=
2β
2β
¯
ᾱ
1−β
(β + c)2
= 1 − pG − c +
.
16β
Z

MS
U{P2,G}
.

(3.7)

MG
when β > β̄, where β̄ =
Comparing the two, we can show that E[U M S ] > U{P1,G}
√
c/(7 − 4 3). That is, when the uncertainty associated with the specialized brand

is higher than this threshold, consumers prefer to let the retailer offer them the
specialized brand first but when this uncertainty is low, they prefer to directly ask
for the general purpose brand. I summarize the findings in Proposition 3.
Proposition 3. Under the mediated access selling format, consumers ask for the
product category when their match uncertainty with the specialized brand is high, β >
β̄, in which case the retailer offers the specialized brand first and makes a higher profit
per visiting consumer than in the direct access case. Otherwise, consumers ask for

30

the general purpose brand directly in which case the retailer makes a higher profit per
visiting consumer following the direct access selling format instead.
Proof. We have already shown that π M S > π D . So when the uncertainty associated
with the specialized brand is high, β > β̄, the retailer makes a higher profit per
visiting consumer using the mediated access format. When this uncertainty is low,
β ≤ β̄, consumers ask for and purchase the general purpose brand G directly under
the mediated access format, and the retailer makes only the margin from the general
purpose brand given by pG . Since π D = pG +

β
8

> pG , the retailer makes a higher

profit per visiting consumer following the direct access format.
The intuition behind this result is that when the uncertainty associated with the
specialized brand is high, consumers prefer to be shown the specialized brand first
as it might offer them a higher utility by being a better match than the general
purpose brand. As discussed before, the retailer is able to use this to increase the
demand for the specialized brand to generate a higher profit. On the other hand,
when this uncertainty is low, in the absence of a substantial upside, consumers prefer
to purchase the general purpose brand directly. The retailer then loses out on the
revenue from the specialized brand, making a lower profit than the direct access case.
3.3.3. Selling Format Decision
Until now, we have solved the game conditional on a consumer visiting the retailer.
I shall now solve the rest of the game using backward induction. I first look at
a consumer’s decision to visit the retailer or not. This allows us to compute the
overall demand and hence total profit for the retailer. As described earlier, a uniform
mass of consumers is distributed between 0 and 1. A consumer located at x ∈ [0, 1]
visits the retailer if her expected utility from visiting the retailer is higher than her
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transportation cost, that is E[Uvisit ] − tx ≥ 0. Assuming t is high enough, such that
t > E[Uvisit ], all consumers located between 0 and
the demand for the retailer is then given by

E[Uvisit ]
t

visit the retailer, that is,

E[Uvisit ]
.
t

Under the direct access selling format, the expected utility for a consumer visiting
the retailer is given by,
Z

ᾱ

1
E[U ] =
dα +
2β
1−β
β
= 1 − pG + .
16
D

UGD .

The retailer’s demand in that case is given by

Z

1+β

ᾱ

E[U D ]
.
t

USD .

1
dα,
2β
(3.8)

Since the retailer incurs a fixed

cost F for setting up the direct access selling format, the total profit of the retailer
is given by, ΠD =

E[U D ] D
π
t

− F = (β + 16(1 − pG ))(β + 8pG )/(128t) − F .

Under the mediated access selling format, there are two cases. When the uncertainty
associated with the specialized brand is low, β ≤ β̄, the consumers ask for the general
purpose brand directly and obtain an expected utility of 1−pG and the retailer makes
a profit of pG per visiting consumer. The total profit of the retailer is then given by
ΠM G = (1 − pG )pG /t.
When the uncertainty associated with the specialized brand is high, β > β̄, consumers’
expected utility from visiting the retailer is given by E[U M S ] as derived in Equation
3.7. The retailer’s demand is then given by
ΠM S =

E[U M S ] M S
π
t

E[U M S ]
t

and it makes a total profit of

= ((β + c)2 + 16β(1 − pG − c))((β + c)2 + 8βpG )/(128β 2 t).

The retailer compares its total profits in the mediated access and direct access cases
in order to decide which selling format to adopt. I summarize the retailer’s selling
format choice in equilibrium in Proposition 4.
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Proposition 4. In equilibrium, the retailer chooses:
• the mediated access selling format, offering only the general purpose brand, when
the uncertainty associated with the specialized brand is low, β ≤ min{β̄, β̄¯},
• the mediated access selling format, offering the specialized brand first, when the
uncertainty associated with the specialized brand is high, β > β̄, and the retail
price of the general purpose brand is low, pG ≤ p̄G ,
• the direct access selling format otherwise.
p
√
where β̄ = c/(7 − 4 3), β̄¯ = 4(pG + 4 + 8F t + p2G − 4pG − 2) and p̄G = (−12β 3 c +
β 2 (−26c2 + 32c + 128F t) + 4β(4 − 3c)c2 + c4 )/(8βc(18β + c)).
Proof. When β > β̄, the retailer compares ΠM S with ΠD . We can show that ΠM S >
−12β 3 c+β 2 (−26c2 +32c+128F t)+4β(4−3c)c2 +c4
ΠD when pG < p̄G , where p̄G =
. When β ≤ β̄,
8βc(18β+c)
the retailer compares ΠM G with ΠD . We can show that, ΠM G > ΠD when β < β̄¯
p
where β̄¯ = 4(pG + 4 + 8F t + p2G − 4pG − 2).
The parameter regions where the retailer adopts these selling formats in equilibrium
are illustrated in Figure (2). When consumers’ match uncertainty with the specialized
brand is high (β > β̄), the retailer makes a higher profit per visiting consumer under
the mediated access format (offering the specialized brand first). However, at the
same time, consumers’ expected utility from visiting the mediated access retailer is
lower which results in a reduced overall demand. The retailer, hence, faces a trade-off
between making a higher profit per visiting consumer and increasing overall demand.
When the retail price of the general purpose brand is high (pG > p̄G ), the retailer’s
profit per visiting consumer in the direct access format is high enough that it finds it
optimal to increase overall demand by following the direct access format (even after
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Figure 2: Selling formats in equilibrium plotted with the retail price of the general
purpose brand pG and the uncertainty associated with the specialized brand β (for
F = 0.03, c = 0.045 and t = 1).
paying fixed cost F ). On the other hand, when the retail price of the general purpose
brand is low (pG ≤ p̄G ), the retailer finds it optimal to increase the profit per visiting
consumer at the cost of reducing overall demand.
When consumers’ match uncertainty with the specialized brand is low (β ≤ β̄), the
retailer makes a higher profit per visiting consumer and has a higher overall demand
under the direct access format as compared to the mediated access format (offering
only the general purpose brand). However, the retailer incurs a fixed cost F for
setting up the direct access store. Since the retailer’s total profit under direct access
increases with β, when β is medium (β̄¯ < β < β̄), the retailer prefers the direct access
format even after paying the fixed cost F but when β is low (β < β̄¯), the retailer
prefers to adopt the mediated access format so as to not pay the fixed cost for setting
up the direct access store.
To further illustrate the retailer’s selling format choice, I plot the retailer’s profit under
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Figure 3: Retailer’s total profit ΠR and retail price for the specialized brand pS plotted
with the uncertainty associated with the specialized brand (equilibrium profits are
drawn in black) (for pG = 0.5, F = 0.03, c = 0.045 and t = 1).
the two formats as a function of consumers’ match uncertainty with the specialized
brand for pG = 0.5 in Figure (3a). When this match uncertainty is high, β > β̄,
the retailer makes a higher profit following the mediated access format, offering the
specialized brand first. When this match uncertainty is medium, β̄¯ < β ≤ β̄, the
retailer adopts the direct access format instead because it can no longer offer the
specialized brand first under the mediated access format (as consumers find it optimal
to ask for the general purpose brand directly). The retailer’s profit under the direct
access format decreases as β decreases and when this match uncertainty is low, β < β̄¯,
the retailer adopts the mediated access format (so as to not incur the fixed cost F ),
reducing its product offering to only the general purpose brand.3
The price charged by the retailer for the specialized brand pS is plotted in Figure
(3b). As noted earlier, the retail price for the specialized brand is higher than the
retail price for the general purpose brand. As the uncertainty associated with the
3

Note that the boundary between the direct and mediated access selling formats when β > β̄ is
downwards sloping in β (as illustrated in Figure 2). That is, p̄G is always decreasing in β when it is
within the allowed parameter range. This happens because the retailer’s profit and overall demand
increase at a higher rate with β under the direct access selling format as compared to the mediated
access selling format. As a result, for a small range of pG (∼ 0.73 − 0.76 in Figure 2), the retailer
chooses the mediated access selling format, offering the specialized brand first when β is high but
finds it optimal to adopt the direct access selling format when β is even higher.
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Figure 4: Selling formats in equilibrium plotted with consumers’ shopping cost c and
the direct access format fixed cost F (for t = 1, pG = 0.75 and β = 0.75).
specialized brand increases, the retailer is able to charge a higher retail price for
it. When this uncertainty is higher than β̄, the retailer follows the mediated access
format and is able to charge an even higher price by taking advantage of consumers’
shopping costs. When this uncertainty is lower than β̄¯, the retailer reduces its product
offering to only the general purpose brand and hence does not set pS .
We study the effect of consumers’ shopping cost c and the fixed cost for setting up the
direct access format F on the retailer’s selling format decision in Figure (4). When
consumers’ shopping cost c is low, the retailer follows the mediated access format
offering the specialized brand first. This is in line with the observation that the
mediated access format is more popular in rural areas in emerging markets where
consumers’ opportunity cost of time is smaller. The direct access format is more
popular in the developed world and urban areas in emerging markets where consumers
generally have a higher opportunity cost of time. All else equal, the retailer follows
the direct access selling format, when the fixed cost for setting up the direct access
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Figure 5: Retailer’s profit plotted with consumer’s shopping cost for different levels
of the price of the general purpose brand (for β = 0.75, t = 1 and F = 0.02).
format F is low. This is in line with the observation that the direct access format is
more popular in the organized retailing sector that has a lower fixed cost for setting
up a direct access store due to logistical and scale advantages.
Lastly, we study how the retailer’s profit, consumer surplus and total surplus vary
with consumer’s shopping cost c (when F is low). When c is low, the retailer follows
the mediated access selling format. We know that the retailer’s profit per visiting
consumer under the mediated access format increases with consumers’ shopping cost
c as it allows the retailer to shift the demand more towards the specialized brand.
However, as consumers’ shopping cost increases, their surplus from visiting the mediated access retailer decreases which leads to a lower overall demand for the retailer.
As a result of these opposing forces, the retailer’s profit under the mediated access
format decreases as c increases (when pG is not too low) as shown in Figure (5a).
As the shopping cost increases further, the retailer switches to the direct access format where its profits are independent of consumers shopping costs. When pG is low,
(pG <

−3β 3 −13β 2 c+8β 2 −9βc2 +8βc+c3
),
36β 2 +4βc

the retailer’s profit can actually increase with β

as shown in Figure (5b). That is, the mediated access retailer might find it optimal
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Figure 6: Consumer surplus and total surplus plotted with consumer’s shopping cost
(for β = 0.75, pG = 0.75, t = 1 and F = 0.02).
to increase consumers’ shopping cost up to an extent (by increasing waiting time /
increasing hassle cost) if the margin on the general purpose brand is low enough for
it to find it optimal to increase its profit per consumer at the cost of overall demand.
We study how consumer surplus varies with consumer’s shopping cost in Figure (6a).
The consumer surplus first decreases with consumers’ shopping cost, but then jumps
to its highest value and remains constant as the shopping cost increases further. The
consumer surplus decreases first because the retailer following the mediated access
format takes advantage of consumers’ higher shopping cost to charge a higher price for
the specialized brand. As noted earlier, as consumers’ surplus decreases, the overall
demand of the retailer also decreases. As a result, the retailer switches to the direct
access format when the shopping cost is high. The consumer surplus then jumps to its
highest value as consumers no longer incur a shopping cost in the direct access format.
This illustrates how when shopping costs are high, the retailer prefers to internalize
consumers’ shopping costs to increase overall demand by adopting the direct access
selling format instead (incurring fixed cost F ). The retailer’s selling format decision
is then based on how easy it wishes to make it for consumers to determine their match
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with the specialized brand. The retailer can either transfer the cost associated with
this to consumers by following the mediated access selling format or it can internalize
this cost by adopting the direct access format, incurring fixed cost F and making
it easier for the consumers to inspect the two brands. Note that Figure (6a) shows
consumer surplus under conditions (low F ) where the retailer prefers to follow the
direct access selling format when shopping cost is high. Under conditions where the
retailer prefers to follow the mediated access selling format (offering only the general
purpose brand) when shopping cost is high, the consumer surplus attains its lowest
value instead. I state the result on consumer surplus in Proposition 5.
Proposition 5. The consumer surplus under the direct access selling format is higher
than the consumer surplus under the mediated access selling format. Within the
mediated access selling format, consumer surplus is higher when the retailer offers
the specialized brand first in equilibrium than when the retailer offers only the general
purpose brand in equilibrium.
The total surplus, plotted in Figure (6b) follows a similar pattern. Unlike retailer’s
profit, total surplus always decreases as consumers’ shopping cost c increases when c
is small but then jumps to a higher value at the point where the retailer decides to
switch to the direct access format.

3.4. Extensions
3.4.1. Asymmetric Wholesale Prices
In the base model I had assumed that the wholesale prices for both the general purpose
and specialized brands G and S were the same and set to zero. In this section, I allow
the wholesale prices to be asymmetric and non zero. The retailer purchases G and S
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at wholesale prices wG and wS , respectively. As mentioned earlier, the retail price of
the general purpose brand is fixed at pG . The retailer hence makes a fixed exogenous
margin mG = pG −wG on the general purpose brand G. I make technical assumptions
to ensure that the demand for both brands is non-zero when consumers have had a
chance to examine them both, c < 1 − pG , wS − wG < 3β − c and wG − wS < β.
Lemma 1. When the wholesale prices for S and G are asymmetric,
• When following the direct access selling format, the retailer offers the specialized
brand at retail price (pG + mG + wS + β)/2, providing a higher margin to the
retailer than the margin on the general purpose brand mG .
• When following the mediated access selling format, the retailer prefers to offer
the specialized brand S first and sets its retail price at (pG + mG + wS + β + c)/2,
providing a higher margin to the retailer than in the direct access format.
The retailer charges a higher price for the specialized brand in both formats, unless
the wholesale price for the general purpose brand is much higher than the specialized
brand, wS − wG > b. While high asymmetry in the wholesale prices can cause the
retail price of the specialized brand to be lower, the retailer’s margin on the specialized
brand remains higher than the margin on the general purpose brand in both formats.
Under the mediated access format, when offering S first, the retailer is able to extract
an even higher margin from the specialized brand by taking advantage of consumers’
shopping costs. Because of this higher margin, the mediated access retailer prefers to
offer the specialized brand first in order to shift the demand towards the specialized
brand.
Proposition 6. In equilibrium, the retailer chooses:
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• the mediated access selling format, offering only the general purpose brand, when
consumers’ shopping costs are high, c ≥ c̄, and retailer’s fixed cost for setting
up a direct access store is low, F ≤ F̄ .
• the mediated access selling format, offering the specialized brand first, when
consumers’ shopping costs are low, c < c̄, and retailer’s fixed cost for setting up
a direct access store is high, F ≤ F̄¯ ,
• the direct access selling format otherwise.4
The parameter regions where the retailer adopts these selling formats in equilibrium
are illustrated in Figure (7). The effect of consumer’s shopping cost c and retailer’s
fixed cost for setting up a direct access store F on equilibrium choices by the retailer
is illustrated in Figure (7b). The effect is qualitatively the same as in the base model;
the retailer is likelier to adopt the mediated access format offering the specialized
brand first when consumers’ shopping cost is low and it is likelier to adopt the direct
access format when its fixed cost for the format is low.
Modeling asymmetry in wholesale prices allows us to study the effect of the general
purpose brand’s margin on the retailer’s selling format choice in equilibrium (see
Figure 7a). When the retailer’s margin on the general purpose brand is small, the
retailer adopts the mediated access format offering the specialized brand in equilibrium, when this margin is high and the specialized brand is differentiated enough,
the retailer adopts the direct access format. This offers an explanation for why in
emerging markets we observe that large organized retailers and retail chains that are
p
where c̄ = 7β + mG − pG + wS − 4 3β 2 + βmG − βpG + βwS , F̄ = (β − mG + pG − wS )2 (β 2 −
2pG (7β + mG + wS ) − 2wS (β − mG ) + 6βmG + 16β + m2G + p2G + wS2 )/(128β 2 t) and F̄¯ = c(12β 3 +
4pG (13β 2 −wS (10β −3c+6mG +3wS )+β(9c−14mG −8)−c2 +3cmG −3m2G )+2wS (2(−5β 2 +β(−5c+
6mG + 8) + c2 − 3cmG + 3m2G ) + wS (2β − 3c + 6mG + 2wS )) + β 2 (26c + 92mG − 32) + 4β(3c2 − c(7mG +
4) + mG (5mG + 8)) + 6p2G (6β − c + 2mG + 2wS ) − (c − 2mG )(c2 − 2cmG + 2m2G ) − 4p3G )/(128β 2 t).
4
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Figure 7: Selling formats in equilibrium under asymmetric wholesale prices (for t = 1,
pG = 1/3 and wS = 1/8).
able to bargain for deeper discounts from manufacturers typically employ the direct
access format while small unorganized retailers that might not be able to bargain for
trade discounts typically employ the mediated access format.
The relationship between consumers’ match uncertainty and retailer’s format choice
is qualitatively similar to the relationship in the base model under certain parameter
values. For instance, in Figure (7a), (when the margin on the general purpose brand is
medium) when consumers’ match uncertainty is low, the retailer adopts the mediated
access access format offering only the general purpose brand, when consumers’ match
uncertainty is medium, the retailer adopts the direct access format and when the
match uncertainty is high, the retailer adopts the mediated access format offering the
specialized brand first.
Lastly, we study how the retail price for the specialized brand pS , retailer’s total profit,
consumer surplus and total surplus vary with the margin on the general purpose brand
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Figure 8: Retail price of the specialized brand, retailer’s profit, consumer surplus and
total surplus plotted with the margin on the general purpose brand (for b = 3/4,
pG = 3/4, t = 1, c = 1/8, wS = 1/8 and F = 0.06).
mG . The retail price charged by the retailer for the specialized brand is plotted in
Figure (8a). When mG is small, the retailer follows the mediated access format offering
the specialized brand first. As mG increases, the retailer finds it optimal to price the
specialized brand higher, to shift demand towards the general purpose brand. When
mG is medium, the retailer shifts to the direct access format and the retail price for
S drops as the direct access retailer cannot take advantage of consumers’ shopping
costs. When mG is high, the retailer shifts to mediated access format again, offering
only the general purpose brand and hence does not set a price for S.
The retailer’s profit generally increases with the margin on the general purpose brand
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mG , however, counterintuitively, it can also drop discretely as this margin increases.
This happens at the point where the retailer switches to the direct access format as
shown in Figure (8b). As noted before, when mG is small, the retailer follows the
mediated access format offering the specialized brand S first and the retail price for
S increases with mG . When mG is medium, the retail price for S is high, such that
consumers find it optimal to ask the mediated access retailer for the general purpose
brand directly. This induces the retailer to follow the direct access format instead,
which leads to a drop in profit as the direct access retailer cannot take advantage of
consumer’s shopping costs. Following the drop, the profit increases at a higher rate
than it did before. This happens because the demand for the general purpose brand
is higher under the direct access format. The profit increases at an even higher rate
when mG is high and the retailer switches to mediated access format offering only the
general purpose brand.
Following the same logic, consumer surplus, though generally decreases as mG increases because of an increase in the price of the specialized brand; it can jump to a
higher value as the retailer switches to the direct access format and drop to a lower
value as the retailer switches to the mediated access format reducing its product offering to only the general purpose brand. The consumer surplus and total surplus are
plotted with mG in Figure (8c) and Figure (8d), respectively.
3.4.2. Endogenous Pricing for the General Purpose Brand
In the analysis until now, we have assumed that the price for the general purpose
brand G is fixed and given exogenously. In this section, I extend the model to allow
the retailer to set the price of the general purpose brand endogenously. I assume
that the retailer sets the price for the general purpose brand in the first stage, along
with its decision to choose the selling format. Consumers are aware of the price of
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the general purpose brand before they visit the store but are unaware of the price of
the specialized brand until they get to examine the product. This assumption is in
line with the assumption that consumers are familiar with the characteristics of the
general purpose brand but are unfamiliar with the characteristics of the specialized
brand.
The timing of the game is given as follows. In Stage 1, the retailer decides its selling
format and sets the price for the general purpose brand pG . In Stage 2, consumers
based on their expected utility decide whether to visit the retailer or not. In Stage 3,
the retailer offers products according to the chosen selling format and consumers decide which product to purchase. As before, Stage 3 of the game is further divided into
substages depending upon the selling format chosen by the retailer. These substages
are the same as in the base model.
I solve the game using backward induction, starting with Stage 3 first, to derive a
subgame perfect solution. The solution till Stage 2 is discussed in the base model.
As derived earlier, the profit for the retailer under the direct access selling format is
given by,

ΠD =

(β + 16(1 − pG ))(β + 8pG )
− F.
128t

(3.9)

Under the mediated access selling format, there are two cases. The retailer offers
the specialized brand first when the uncertainty associated with the general purpose
√
brand is high (β > β̄), where β̄ = c/(7 − 4 3). When this uncertainty is low, the
consumers ask the retailer for the general purpose brand directly. The profit for the
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retailer under the mediated access case is given by,
(1 − pG )pG
t
((β + c)2 + 16β(1 − pG − c))((β + c)2 + 8βpG )
=
128β 2 t

ΠM G =
ΠM S

whenβ ≤ β̄,

(3.10)

otherwise.

(3.11)

In Stage 1, the retailer sets the price for the general purpose brand pG and decides
the selling format. I solve for the optimal price pG for each of the three cases. Under
β
1
direct access, the optimal price for the general purpose brand is given by pD
G = 2 − 32 .
S
=
Under the mediated access case, when β > β̄, pM
G

1−c
2

−

(β+c)2
.
32b

When β ≤ β̄,

G
pM
= 21 . The retailer compares its profits under the given cases to determine its
G

selling format. I summarize the findings in the Proposition 7.
Proposition 7. When the retailer sets the price of the general purpose brand endogenously, in equilibrium, the retailer chooses:
• the mediated access selling format, offering only the general purpose brand, when
the uncertainty associated with the specialized brand is low, β ≤ min{β̄, β̄¯},
• the mediated access selling format, offering the specialized brand first, when
the uncertainty associated with the specialized brand is high, β > β̄, and the
retailer’s fixed cost of setting up a direct access store is high, F > F̄ ,
• the direct access selling format otherwise.
√
√
where β̄ = c/(7−4 3), β̄¯ = 16/3( 1 + 4F t−1) and F̄ = (60β 3 c−118β 2 c2 +320β 2 c+
60βc3 − 96βc2 − 9c4 )/(1024β 2 t).
The parameter regions where the retailer adopts these selling Formats in equilibrium
are illustrated in Figure (9). The results are qualitatively similar to the results in the
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base model. When the uncertainty associated with the specialized brand β is high,
the retailer adopts the mediated access selling format offering the specialized brand
first as long as the fixed cost for setting up the direct access store is not too low.
When this uncertainty is medium, the retailer adopts the direct access selling format
as long as the fixed cost is not too high. When this uncertainty is low, the retailer
adopts the mediated access selling format but reduces its product variety offering
only the general purpose product.
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Figure 9: Selling formats in equilibrium under endogenous pricing of the general
purpose brand plotted with the fixed cost of setting up a direct access store F and
the uncertainty associated with the specialized brand β (for c = 0.035 and t = 1).

We now study how the price of the general purpose brand differs across different selling
formats and how it varies with the uncertainty associated with the general purpose
G
brand. It is easy to see that (pM
= 12 ) > (pD
G
G =

1
2

−

β
)
32

S
> (pM
=
G

1−c
2

−

(β+c)2
)
32β

for all possible 0 < β < 1. The price of the general purpose brand is plotted with
the match uncertainty in Figure (10) for medium direct access fixed cost (F ∼ 0.03).
The price of the general purpose product is highest under the mediated access selling
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format when only the general purpose brand is offered by the retailer, second highest
under the direct access selling format and the lowest under the mediated access selling
format when the specialized brand is offered first.
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Figure 10: Retail price for the general purpose brand pG plotted with the uncertainty
associated with the specialized brand β (for F = 0.03, c = 0.045 and t = 1).
Additionally, the price for the general purpose brand weakly decreases as β increases.
When β is low, the retailer offers only the general purpose brand, as a result the
price of the general purpose brand does not depend on its match uncertainty. When
β is medium, the retailer adopts the direct access selling format and the price of the
general purpose brand decreases with β. The intuition behind this result is that as
the uncertainty associated with the general purpose brand increases, the retailer has
a higher opportunity to sell the specialized brand at a higher margin. As a result,
the retailer has an incentive to bring in more consumers to the store. By offering a
lower price for the general purpose brand, the retailer increases the expected utility
of consumers to visit the store, increasing overall demand. Similarly, the price of the
general purpose brand decreases with β when the retailer adopts the mediated access
format offering the specialized brand first (when β is high). The price decreases at a
greater rate in this case as compared to the direct access format because the retailer
is able to take advantage of consumers shopping costs to shift the demand further
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towards the specialized brand.

3.5. Conclusions and Discussion
In this chapter, I develop a theory for different selling formats used by retailers globally, characterized by the different degrees to which customers can access and inspect
products in store. In the direct access selling format, all available products are stocked
on shelves directly accessible to customers for inspection, while store associates offer
minimal assistance. On the other hand, in the mediated access selling format, access
to products is mediated by a store associate who offers products one at a time to
customers and the customers decide whether to purchase an offered product or to
ask for an alternative. The direct access selling format strongly dominates in developed economies and the mediated access selling format has historically dominated
in emerging economies. However, the retailing landscape in emerging markets has
changed over the last couple of decades with a number of multinational companies
entering these markets. As a result, both direct access and mediated access selling formats coexist in significant measure in emerging markets today with the direct access
selling format being popular in the organized retailing sector primarily in urban areas
while the mediated access selling format continues to be dominant in the unorganized
retailing sector in both urban and rural areas.
I develop a theoretical model to study a retailer’s selling format, product assortment
and pricing decisions when consumers have different levels of uncertainty for different
products and have time costs of shopping. I study two types of products, the general
purpose brand provides certain and uniform fit to all consumers while the specialized brand provides ex ante uncertain fit to consumers which can be resolved upon
inspection.
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I find that the retailer’s selling format decision is based on how costly it chooses to
make it for a consumer to determine her match with the specialized product, that
is, whether it chooses to internalize the cost associated with this (by adopting the
direct access selling format) or transfers this cost to the consumer (by adopting the
mediated access selling format). This decision is, in turn, affected by consumers’
match uncertainty with the specialized brand. The retailer chooses the mediated
access selling format when the uncertainty of match value with the specialized brand
is either high or low, and chooses the direct access selling format when this uncertainty
is medium (as long as the margin on the general purpose brand is not too high).
The retailer prefers to offer the specialized brand first under the mediated access
selling format. This is because by offering the specialized brand first, the retailer
is able to resolve consumers’ match uncertainty with the specialized brand and, at
the same time, take advantage of their shopping costs to shift the demand towards
the specialized brand which provides a higher margin of profit for the retailer in
equilibrium. However, the retailer is only able to do so when consumers’ match
uncertainty with the specialized brand is high. Otherwise, consumers find it optimal
to ask for the general purpose brand directly. As a result, the retailer chooses the
mediated access selling format and offers the specialized brand first only when this
match uncertainty is high. When this match uncertainty is medium, the retailer
chooses to internalize consumers’ shopping costs by adopting the direct access selling
format instead, offering both brands simultaneously. When this match uncertainty
is low, the retailer again chooses the mediated access selling format but reduces its
product assortment, offering only the general purpose brand.
The model results help explain a number of observations about the format choice
of retailers. Large organized retailers are able to bargain for deeper discounts from
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manufacturers which small unorganized retailers may not be able to do; according
to the model, this will induce the former to choose the direct access format and the
latter the mediated access format. This offers an explanation for why in emerging
markets we observe that large organized retailers and retail chains typically employ
the direct access format while small unorganized retailers typically employ the mediated access format. Furthermore, logistical and scale advantages enjoyed by organized
retailers allow them to reduce the costs of setting up, maintaining and running the
stores in the direct access selling format. This, however, is expensive for individuals
and families, who typically run unorganized stores, explaining why they prefer to
adopt the mediated access selling format instead. We also observe that the direct
access format is more popular in developed economies and in urban areas in emerging
economies. This may be because in developed economies and in urban areas in emerging economies customers’ shopping costs are larger which, according to the model,
induces the retailers to prefer the direct access format. The results from the model
are also consistent with various observations about the different store formats, for
instance, direct access stores carry larger assortments than mediated access stores,
have lower prices and serve a larger clientele.
I conclude with a discussion of some limitations of the model considered in this chapter and directions for future work. In the model, it is assumed that the wholesale
prices on offer are exogenous and are the same under the direct access and mediated
access selling formats. It is possible that manufacturers would price their products
differently or even change the product line, when they know that the retailer following
mediated access format has the ability to offer one of the products first and hence
increase its demand. I consider the effect of selling format on manufacturer strategies
in the second essay of this dissertation. Additionally, competition between retailers
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has not been modeled in this chapter which does not allow us to study consumers’
store choice when they have access to stores with different selling formats. Instead
I allow consumers to have an outside option when deciding whether to visit a retailer or not. The main insights developed in this work should transfer to when we
have retailers competing with each other, however it would be interesting to develop
further insights by modeling competition in future work. Another avenue for future
work would be to explore other contexts where products are presented to consumers
sequentially instead of simultaneously. For example, sets of products are presented
sequentially to consumers in online retailing which is similar to the mediated access
selling formats in a physical setting studied in this chapter. It would be interesting in
future work to study how these sets are constructed when consumers have different
levels of uncertainty for different products.
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CHAPTER 4 : Manufacturer Strategies and Channel Interactions in
Mediated vs Direct Access Selling Formats
4.1. Introduction
In the first essay of this dissertation, we looked at how customers interact differently
with the retailer across the two selling formats and studied retailers’ selling format,
product assortment and pricing decisions. In this chapter, I focus on upstream effects
of direct vs mediated access selling formats on manufacturer strategies and profit
sharing within the channel. Specifically, I study how a retailer’s ability to push the
demand of certain products, under the mediated access selling format, provides it
some bargaining power over manufacturers.
I build a theoretical model in which a manufacturer that has the ability to offer two
horizontally differentiated products interacts with a retailer that can follow one of the
two different selling formats. The manufacturer sets wholesale prices and decides the
product variety it wants to offer to the retailer. The retailer sets retail prices. Under
the mediated access selling format, the retailer has the ability to selectively increase
the demand of one of the products. When the manufacturer offers full product variety,
the retailer decides which product to push to its customers.
I find that product variety and the retailer’s chosen selling format in equilibrium
depend on the level of influence the retailer has on product demands when selectively
recommending them to consumers. The retailer adopts the mediated access selling
format when its ability to selectively push the demand of certain products is either
low or high. When this ability is medium, the retailer adopts the direct access selling
format. Counterintuitively, the manufacturer reduces the product variety, offering
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only a single product, when the retailer’s ability to selectively push the demand of
certain products is high. It offers full product variety when the retailer’s ability is
low or medium.
This happens because the mediated access retailer’s ability to selectively push product
demands and its ability to decide which of the two products to push to consumers
gives it some bargaining power over the manufacturer. This allows the retailer to fully
extract the extra surplus generated in the channel by its ability. When this ability
is low, the manufacturer offers full product variety. Otherwise, the manufacturer
handicaps the mediated access retailer by reducing its product variety in order to
share the extra surplus generated in the channel by the retailer’s ability. As a result,
the retailer adopts the direct access selling format to ensure full product variety (and
hence increased total demand) when this ability is medium. In case this ability is
high, the retailer prefers to adopt the mediated access selling format even with a
reduced product offering and shares the extra surplus generated by its ability with
the manufacturer.
The results provide another explanation for why traditional retailing has been able to
survive the advent of large organized retailers in many emerging markets. I show that
the selling format typically used by traditional retailers in these markets affords them
some bargaining power over the manufacturer in certain cases. This allows them to
extract higher profits. The model findings are also consistent with various real world
observations about these selling formats, for instance, direct access retail stores carry
larger assortment size and serve a larger customer base.
There is a nascent academic literature in the field of retailing in emerging markets.
Jerath et al. (2016) investigate the entry of modern retailing in a market dominated
by traditional retailers and find that the entry of an efficient modern retailer leads to
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the exit of a number of traditional retailers from the market resulting in a reduced
overall competition in the market. Narayan et al. (2015) study early stage adoption
of modern retailing in emerging markets and find that consumers in the upper and
lower middle classes have a higher preference for modern forms of retailing. Sudhir
and Talukdar (2015) study IT adoption in the Indian retailing sector and find that
corruption and poor enforcement of tax laws motivates retailers to avoid transparency
by avoiding IT adoption at the cost of productivity. To my knowledge, this is the
first attempt to study channel interactions between manufacturers and traditional vs
modern retailers where retailers can adopt different selling formats.
A significant body of literature in marketing has looked at channel structures and
their implications on marketing decisions (McGuire and Staelin 1983, Coughlan 1985,
Moorthy 1988). There is also a rich stream of literature that investigates marketing
actions that can help coordinate the distribution channel (Jeuland and Shugan 1983,
Moorthy 1987, Lal 1990, Gerstner and Hess 1995, Raju and Zhang 2005, and Dukes
and Liu 2010). In contrast to previous work on distribution channels, we study the
effect of a retailer’s selling format and its ability to choose which product to push
to consumers on product variety, prices and profit sharing in the channel. Another
stream of literature in marketing has studied Every Day Low Price (EDLP) vs HighLow Promotional Price (HILO) store formats (Lal and Rao 1997, Bell and Lattin
1998, Galata, Bucklin and Hanssens 1999). The selling formats studied in this work
are distinct from the retail price formats studied in these papers which have been
examined under the direct access selling format.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 4.2, I lay out the model
framework. In Section 4.3, I analyze the model, derive the results and discuss the
insights. In Section 4.4, I analyze extensions to the basic model to show the robustness
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of the results and to derive additional insights. In Section 4.5, I conclude the chapter
and identify limitations as well as areas for future research.

4.2. Model
I model a single manufacturer M that manufactures two horizontally differentiated
products with degree of substitutability θ/(1 + θ) where θ > 0. I assume that the two
products are symmetric in quality and have zero marginal costs. I shall relax these
assumption in later sections and show that the key results of the model continue to
hold under certain parameter values.
The manufacturer sells these products through a single retailer R. The retailer can
adopt one of two different selling formats to sell its products. First, the retailer can
follow a “direct access” selling format in which all products being carried by the
retailer are arranged neatly on shelves for consumers to inspect on their own. The
retailer plays a minimal role in consumers’ product evaluation and choice process.
Second, the retailer can follow a “mediated access” selling format in which all carried brands are stocked inside the store away from direct access of consumers. The
consumers interact with a shopkeeper, from across a counter at the front of the store
and the shopkeeper fetches products for consumers on demand. By virtue of this
selling format, the retailer can push the demand of one of the products by selectively
recommending it to its customers. I capture this ability by parameter γ ≥ 0 which
represents the amount of influence the retailer has on the base demands of the offered products. I assume the following demand specification, where the product being
pushed by the retailer is labeled 1 and the product that is not being pushed is labeled
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2,

q1 = 1 + γ − (1 + θ)p1 + θp2 ,

(4.1)

q2 = 1 − γ − (1 + θ)p2 + θp1 .

(4.2)

where p1 and p2 are the retail prices of the two products, set by the retailer, and θ > 0
captures the degree of substitutability between the two products (given by θ/(1 + θ)).
The base demand of the product being pushed by the retailer increases by γ while
the demand for the other product decreases by γ, keeping the total base demand for
the category the same.
I allow the manufacturer to offer only one product to the retailer, if that is more
profitable, thereby reducing the product variety in its offering. The demand for the
single product can then be derived by assuming that the retail price of the product
that would not have been pushed by the retailer is such that no consumers would buy
it. That is, set p2 such that q2 is zero and substitute it in the expression for q1 . The
demand for the only product being offered is then given by,

q10 =

1 + 2θ + γ 1 + 2θ
−
p1 .
1+θ
1+θ

(4.3)

Note that this demand is increasing in γ as the retailer would use its influence to
recommend the only product being offered by the manufacturer to its customers.
The retailer builds the amount of influence it has over the demands of the two products by investing in it, incurring a cost cγ 2 that is quadratic in the level of this
influence, where c > 0 is the quadratic investment cost coefficient. For example,
traditional mediated access retailers in emerging markets can increase their influence
by investing in better relationships with their customers increasing the value of their
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recommendations. To facilitate the exposition of the results, I assume that γ is fixed
and exogenous in the base model. In an extension, I endogenize γ by allowing the
retailer to invest into this ability and show that the key insights continue to hold
true. I also assume that γ < 1/2 to ensure meaningful competition between the two
products and that the investment cost coefficient is not too high c < 1/(2 + 4θ), to
ensure that the mediated access retailer is not worse off with its ability to selectively
recommend products to consumers.
The retailer purchases the two products from the manufacturer at wholesale prices w1
and w2 respectively, which are set by the manufacturer. The retailer’s profit function
is given by,

πR =




q1 (p1 − w1 ) + q2 (p2 − w2 ) − cγ 2

if both products are offered,



q10 (p1 − w1 ) − cγ 2

if only one product is offered.

(4.4)

When the retailer chooses the direct access retailing format, it does not have the
ability to recommend products selectively to its customers as all products are directly
accessible on shelves where the customers can inspect the products themselves. The
demands for the offered products and the retailer’s profit can then be derived by
setting γ to zero in the earlier expressions.
The manufacturer sets the wholesale prices for the two products and decides whether
to offer one or two products to the retailer. The manufacturer’s profit function is
given by,

πM =




q 1 w 1 + q 2 w 2

if both products are offered,



q10 w1

if only one product is offered.

(4.5)
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The timing of the game is as follows. In Stage 1, the retailer decides its selling
format, In Stage 2, the manufacturer decides to offer either one or both products
to the retailer, in Stage 3, it sets the wholesale prices for the offered product(s), in
Stage 4, the retailer decides which product to selectively push to its customers and
in Stage 5, it sets the retail prices for the offered product(s). I shall solve the game
by backward induction to derive the sub-game perfect equilibrium.

4.3. Analysis and Results
4.3.1. Direct Access Selling Format
I first quickly derive the results for the direct access selling format in order to use them
as a benchmark to compare with under the mediated access selling format. Under
this scenario, the retailer does not have the ability to selectively push products to its
customers. In Stage 5, when the manufacturer offers both products to the retailer
at wholesale prices w1 and w2 , the retailer sets retail prices p1 and p2 in order to
maximize its profit given by,


 


DA
DA
DA
DA
DA
πR
= 1 − (1 + θ)pDA
pDA
+ 1 − (1 + θ)pDA
pDA
.
1 + θp2
1 − w1
2 + θp1
2 − w2

(4.6)

Solving, we get, pDA
= (1 + w1DA )/2 and pDA
= (1 + w2DA )/2. Since the retailer cannot
1
2
push products to consumers under the direct access selling format, there is no Stage
4 in this game. In Stage 3 the manufacturer sets wholesale prices w1DA and w2DA to
maximize its profit given in Equation (4.5). Solving, we get w1DA = w2DA = 1/2. The
DA
retailer and manufacturer profits are given by πRDA = 1/8 and πM
= 1/4 respectively.
0

The demand for a single product being offered by the manufacturer is given by q1DA =
1+2θ
(1
1+θ

0

− pDA
1 ). The results when the manufacturer offers only one product to the
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retailer can then be derived analogously. The retailer and manufacturer profits in
0

0

DA
that scenario are given by πRDA = (1 + 2θ)/(16 + 16θ) and πM
= (1 + 2θ)/(16 + 16θ).

In Stage 2 the manufacturer compares its profits when offering one vs two products
to the retailer to decide the size of its product offering. I summarize the results in
Proposition 8.
Proposition 8. Under the direct access selling format, the manufacturer decides to
offer full product variety to the retailer, setting wholesale prices w1DA = w2DA = 1/2.
DA
The retailer and manufacturer profits are given by πRDA = 1/8 and πM
= 1/4.

The intuition behind this result is that when the manufacturer offers two products to
the retailer, the horizontal differentiation between the two products increases overall
demand which allows the channel profits to increase as compared to when the manufacturer offers only a single product. The manufacturer, hence prefers to offer its full
product variety to the retailer.
4.3.2. Mediated Access Selling Format
Manufacturer Offers Two Products
I now study the case where the retailer picks the mediated access selling format. Under
this scenario, the retailer has the ability to selectively push products to its customers.
I begin by analyzing the case where the manufacturer offers both products to the
retailer at wholesale prices w1MA and w2MA . In Stage 5, under the case where the
retailer decides to push product 1, it sets retail prices pMA
and pMA
so as to maximize
1
2
its profit given in Equation (4.4). Solving, we get, pMA
= (1 + w1MA )/2 + γ/(2 + 4θ)
1
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and pMA
= (1 + w2MA )/2 − γ/(2 + 4θ). The retailer’s profit is given by,
2
πRMA =

2 + (w1MA )2 + (w2MA )2 + θ(w2MA − w1MA )2 − 2(w1MA + w2MA )
4


γ(w2MA − w1MA )
1
+
− c−
γ 2.
2
2 + 4θ

(4.7)

In Stage 4, the retailer decides which product to selectively push by comparing its
profit when pushing 1 to the case where it pushes product 2 instead. The retailer’s
profit when product 2 is pushed can be obtained by exchanging w1MA and w2MA in
Equation (4.7). Comparing the two profits, we find that the retailer decides to push
the product which has the lower wholesale price. I summarize this result in Lemma
2.
Lemma 2. When offered two products by the manufacturer, the mediated access retailer chooses to push the product with the lower wholesale price to its customers. In
other words, the retailer pushes product 1 if w1MA ≤ w2MA .
The intuition behind this result is that the retailer would want to increase the demand
of the product which provides it a greater margin. Since, given all else equal, the
retailer can make a higher margin on the lower wholesale price product, it chooses to
push that product to its customers.
In Stage 3, the manufacturer sets the wholesale prices of the two products so as to
maximize its profit. Without loss of generality, I label the products 1 and 2 such that
w1MA ≤ w2MA . We know from Lemma 2 that the retailer would then push product 1
to its customers. The manufacturer’s problem then reduces to maximizing its profit
given in Equation (4.5) subject to the constraint that w1MA ≤ w2MA . Solving, we
get w1MA = w2MA = 1/2. The retailer and manufacturer profits are given by πRMA =
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MA
1/8 + γ 2 (1/(2 + 4θ) − c) and πM
= 1/4. I summarize the results in Proposition 9.

Proposition 9. Under mediated access, when the manufacturer offers two products
to the retailer,
• the manufacturer sets their wholesale prices to be the same, w1 = w2 = 1/2.
• the mediated access retailer appropriates the entire extra surplus generated by
its ability to selectively influence the demand of the two products,
• the mediated access retailer’s profit increases with this ability γ, while the manufacturer’s profit is independent of it.
Proof. The first result has already been derived in the analysis. Comparing manufacturer and retailer profits under the two selling formats, it is evident that πRMA > πRDA
DA
MA
which shows that the entire extra surplus generated in the channel
= πM
and πM

is extracted by the retailer. The first derivative of the retailer’s profit with respect


d
1
1
to γ, dγ
πRMA = 2γ 2+4θ
− c > 0 under the assumption that c < 2+4θ
and γ > 0.
This proves that the retailer’s profit is increasing with γ. Lastly, it is evident from
the expression of manufacturer’s profit that it is independent of γ.
The intuition behind this result is that since the retailer makes the final decision
for which product to selectively push, it prefers to push the product with the lower
wholesale price, increasing its demand and reducing the demand of the product with
the higher wholesale price. The manufacturer ends up losing more from the lower
wholesale price product that has a greater demand than what it gains from the higher
wholesale price product. This forces the manufacturer to set both wholesale prices to
be equal rendering the retailer indifferent between pushing either of the two products.
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In addition, the manufacturer’s wholesale prices reduce to the prices it charges in
the direct access case. This happens because without the ability to charge a higher
wholesale price for the product that is being pushed by the retailer, the manufacturer
is unable to extract any surplus from the retailer’s ability to selectively recommend
products to its customers and it sets the wholesale prices as if the retailer does not
have that ability. As a result, the manufacturer’s profit is independent of γ while
the retailer’s profit is increasing in this ability. The retailer’s power to decide which
of the two products to selectively push allows it to extract the entire extra surplus
generated by this ability.
To further illustrate this point, consider a model where the manufacturer has the
power to pick which of the two products the retailer would push. This would be
equivalent to solving the manufacturer’s problem without the constraint w1 ≤ w2 .
The manufacturer would then set the wholesale price for the product being pushed as
w1 = 1/2 + γ/(2 + 4θ) and that of the product not being pushed as w2 = 1/2 − γ/(2 +
4θ). Note that w1 > w2 , that is the manufacturer is able to set a higher price for the
product being pushed which would not have been possible if the retailer were to pick
the product to be pushed to consumers. The manufacturer and retailer profits, under
this model, are given by πM = 1/4 + γ 2 /(4 + 8θ) and πR = 1/8 + (1/(8 + 16θ) − c)γ 2 .
Note that, assuming the investment cost coefficient is low enough c < 1/(8 + 16θ),
the manufacturer and retailer profits are both increasing in γ. They both end up
sharing the extra surplus generated by the retailer’s ability to selectively recommend
products to its customers in contrast to the case where the retailer picks the object
being pushed. This shows that the power to decide which product to push plays a
key role in determining how the surplus generated by the retailer’s ability is shared
within the channel.
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Manufacturer Offers One Product
Until now we have considered the sub-game where the manufacturer decides to offer
both products to the retailer. Now let us consider the case where the manufacturer
0

decides to offer only one product to the retailer at a wholesale price w1MA . I again
solve for the sub-game perfect equilibrium by backward induction. In Stage 5, the
0

retailer sets the retail price pMA
so as to maximize its profit given in the single
1
0

product case in Equation (4.4). Solving we get, pMA
= (1 + w1 )/2 + γ/(2 + 4θ). The
1
0

0

0

retailer’s profit is then given by πRMA = (1 − w1MA )(2γ + (1 + 2θ)(1 − w1MA ))/(4 +
4θ) − γ 2 (c − 1/(8θ2 + 12θ + 4)).
Next, I solve for the manufacturer’s problem. The manufacturer sets the wholesale
price, so as to maximize its profit given in the single product case of Equation (4.5).
0

Solving, we get, w1MA = 1/2 + γ/(2 + 4θ). The retailer and manufacturer profits
0

are given by πRMA = (1 + 2θ + 2γ)/(16 + 16θ) + γ 2 (1/(16 + 48θ + 32θ2 ) − c) and
0

MA
πM
= (1 + 2θ + γ)2 /(8 + 24θ + 16θ2 ). I summarize the results in Proposition 10.

Proposition 10. Under the mediated access format, when the manufacturer offers a
single product to the retailer,
• the retailer and the manufacturer share the extra surplus generated by the retailer’s ability to influence the demand of that product,
• the manufacturer’s share of total profit is increasing in γ.
Proof. Comparing the profit of the manufacturer in the mediated and direct access
MA
DA
case, it is evident that πM
> πM
. Hence, the manufacturer extracts some surplus

from the retailer’s ability to push products to consumers. The manufacturer’s share
0

0

0

0

MA
MA
MA
of the profit is given by SM
= πM
/(πM
+ πRMA ). The derivative of this share
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with respect to γ is given by

d
dγ

MA
SM

0



=

64cγ(1+θ)(1+2θ)2 (1+2θ+γ)
(6γ(1+2θ)+3(1+2θ)2 +γ 2 (3−16c(θ+1)(2θ+1)))2

> 0.

Hence, the manufacturer’s share of total profit is increasing in γ.
The intuition behind this result is that since the manufacturer can rely on the retailer
pushing the product that it is offering, the manufacturer is able to set a higher
wholesale price for the product. In addition, in the absence of retailer’s power to pick
which product to offer to consumers, the manufacturer uses its advantage of being
the first mover to extract a higher surplus from the retailer’s ability to selectively
push products to consumers. This results in the manufacturer not only sharing the
generated extra surplus but also in its share increasing with the retailer’s ability to
push products to consumers.
Manufacturer’s Product Variety Decision
We shall now study the manufacturer’s product variety decision. In Stage 2, the
MA
manufacturer compares its profit when offering two products to the retailer πM
,
MA
to its profit when offering only a single product to the retailer πD
. The result is

summarized in Proposition 11.
Proposition 11. Under the mediated access selling format, the manufacturer prefers
to reduce product variety, offering a single product to the retailer when the retailer’s
√
influence over product demands is high, γ > γ1 , where γ1 = 2 + 6θ + 4θ2 − 1 − 2θ.
When the retailer follows the mediated access selling format, the manufacturer faces
a trade-off between offering full product variety in order to increase profits by making
use of the horizontal differentiation between the two products and offering a single
product in order to extract some surplus from the retailer’s ability to push products to consumers. When the retailer’s influence over product demands is high, the

65

manufacturer’s incentive to extract surplus generated by the retailer’s ability to push
products increases. This leads to the manufacturer reducing product variety, offering
a single product to the retailer when its influence over product demands is high.
4.3.3. Retailer’s Selling Format Decision
Lastly, we study the retailer’s selling format decision. The retailer’s profit when it is
following the direct access format, as derived in Proposition 8, is given by πRDA = 1/8.
The retailer’s profit when it is following the mediated access format depends on the
manufacturer’s decision to offer one or two products to the retailer,

πRMA =




 1 + γ2
8

1
2+4θ



 1+2θ+2γ + γ 2
16+16θ

−c



1
16+48θ+32θ2

if γ ≤ γ1 ,
−c



(4.8)

if γ > γ1 .

The retailer compares the two profits in order to decide which selling format to adopt.
I summarize the result in Proposition 12.
Proposition 12. In equilibrium, the retailer follows the mediated access selling format when its influence over product demands is either low γ ≤ γ1 or when the influence is high and the cost coefficient is low, γ > γ2 & c < 1/(8 + 16θ). Otherwise, the
retailer follows the direct access format. The manufacturer reduces product variety,
offering only one product to the retailer when γ > γ2 & c < 1/(8 + 16θ). Where
√
1
.
γ1 = 2 + 6θ + 4θ2 − 1 − 2θ and γ2 = √
1+

2(1+θ)(1/(1+2θ)−8c)

Proof. When γ ≤ γ1 , it is evident that πRMA > πRDA . Hence the retailer follows
mediated access and the manufacturer offers both products to the retailer. When
0

γ > γ1 , the retailer compares πRMA (retailer’s profit when manufacturer offers only
one product, stated in the second case in Equation (4.8)) to πRDA . We can show that
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0

πRMA > πRDA when γ > γ2 & c < 1/(8 + 16θ). Hence, under this case, the retailer
follows mediated access and the manufacturer offers only one product. Otherwise,
the retailer follows the direct access selling format and the manufacturer offers both
products to the retailer, as derived in Proposition 8.
The parameter regions where the retailer adopts these selling formats and the resulting
product variety in equilibrium are illustrated in Figure 11. When the manufacturer
offers full product variety, the retailer prefers the mediated access selling format over
the direct access selling format. But when the retailer’s influence, under mediated
access, over the demands of the products is high, the manufacturer offers only one
product to the retailer. In that case, the retailer has a trade-off between adopting the
direct access selling format in order to obtain full product variety from the manufacturer and adopting the mediated access selling format, accepting only one product
from the manufacturer to keep its ability to push products to consumers. When this
ability is high, and the cost coefficient is not too high, the retailer chooses to adopt the
mediated access selling format even when the manufacturer offers only one product
to the retailer. Otherwise, the retailer adopts the direct access format.
We can also study the effect of product substitutability on selling formats and product
variety in equilibrium. Counterintuitively, the product variety is lower when the
degree of substitutability between the two products is low. This happens because,
given the counter factual that the manufacturer would offer another product with
substitutability θ/(1 + θ), the retailer’s influence on the base demand of a single
product is higher when θ is low (as is evident from Equation (4.3)). The retailer picks
the mediated access format in this case even though the manufacturer is offering a
single product. When the product substitutability is medium, the retailer chooses the
direct access selling format and the manufacturer offers full product variety. When
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Figure 11: Selling Formats and Product Variety in Equilibrium plotted with retailer’s
level of influence over product demands γ, and the substitutability between the two
products θ (for c = 0.02).
the product substitutability is high, the retailer chooses the mediated access selling
format and the manufacturer again provides full product variety.
In addition, we study how manufacturer and retailer profits, and total demand varies
as a function of γ and θ in Figure 12. As discussed, the manufacturer’s profits do
not depend on γ until it is high, in which case, the manufacturer’s profits increase
with γ. The retailer’s profits increase with γ initially, but when γ is medium, the
manufacturer’s threat to reduce product variety induces the retailer to adopt the
direct access format where its profits are independent of γ. When γ is high, the
retailer’s profit start increasing with γ again, when it is profitable for the retailer to
adopt the mediated access format even when the manufacturer is offering only a single
product. The total demand remains constant with γ when it is low, even when the
retailer is following the mediated access format. This happens because the total base
demand is independent of γ and the retailer prices the products in equilibrium such
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Figure 12: Manufacturer’s profit πM , retailer’s profit πR and total demand plotted in
equilibrium with γ and θ (for c = 0.02, θ = 0.2 and c = 0.01, γ = 0.44 respectively).
that the demand only shifts from one to the other. When γ is high, and the retailer
has only one product under the mediated access format, total demand increases with
its ability to recommend that product to its customers.
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The manufacturer’s profits depend on the substitutability between the two products
only when the substitutability is low enough that it induces the retailer to adopt
the mediated access selling format even when the manufacturer is offering a single
product. In that case, the manufacturer’s profits, intuitively, decrease as the substitutability increases (as the retailer’s influence over the base demand of a single
product decreases as θ increases(see Equation (4.3))). The retailer’s profit also generally decreases with θ but it jumps discretely at the point the retailer is able to follow
mediated access access with the manufacturer offering full product variety. Interestingly, total demand initially increases with θ even when the retailer’s influence over
the base demand for the single product decreases with θ. This happens because under
the counterfactual of offering another product with high substitutability, the retailer
is able to charge only a lower price for the single product it is offering, which has a
net effect of increased demand for that product.

4.4. Extensions
4.4.1. Asymmetric Products
In this section, I investigate the robustness of the results from the base model by
extending it to allow for the products to be asymmetric. First, I consider that the
two products might have asymmetric base demands. This can also be understood as
the two products having asymmetric qualities. I also consider asymmetry between
the two products in terms of manufacturer’s marginal costs. However, since the two
problems lead to qualitatively very similar results5 , I discuss only the asymmetric
base demands extension in detail to explain the common insights.
I assume the following demand specification, where product 1 has a higher level of
5

Note that the two problems are not isomorphic.
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base demand given by β > 1. When product 1 is being pushed by the retailer, the
demands are given by,

q1 = β + γ − (1 + θ)p1 + θp2 ,

(4.9)

q2 = 1 − γ − (1 + θ)p2 + θp1 .

(4.10)

When product 2 is being pushed by the retailer, the demands are given by,

q1 = β − γ − (1 + θ)p1 + θp2 ,

(4.11)

q2 = 1 + γ − (1 + θ)p2 + θp1 .

(4.12)

When the manufacturer decides to offer only a single product to the retailer, it picks
the product with the higher base demand. The demand of that product is derived
similar to the base model and is given by,

q10 = β +

γ + θ 1 + 2θ
−
p1 .
1+θ
1+θ

(4.13)

The retailer and manufacturer profits are as given in Equations (4.4) and (4.5). In
line with the base model, I make technical assumptions γ < 1/2 and c < 1/(2 + 4θ)
to ensure meaningful competition between the two products and that the mediated
access retailer is not worse off with its ability to selectively recommend products to
consumers.
Lemma 3. Under the mediated access selling format, when the manufacturer offers
both products to the retailer,
• If the asymmetry between the products is not too high β ≤ 1 + 2γ, the man-
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ufacturer sets wholesale prices w1 and w2 such that the retailer is indifferent
between pushing product 1 or product 2.
• If the asymmetry between products is high, β > 1 + 2γ, the manufacturer sets
wholesale prices w1 and w2 such that the retailer prefers pushing product 1 to
its customers.
This result lays down the foundation for the main results to follow. The intuition
behind this result is similar to that in the base model. The retailer prefers to push
that product to its customers which affords it a higher profit. That means, the retailer
would push product 1 only if its wholesale price is lower than a threshold (in this case
w2 +(β −1)/(1+2θ). However, unless the asymmetry between the products is too high
(β ≤ 1 + 2γ), the manufacturer wants to (if it could pick the product being pushed)
charge a wholesale price for product 1 that is higher than this threshold. This, as
in the base model, results in the manufacturer setting w1 at the threshold value, in
effect making the retailer indifferent between pushing product 1 or 2. However, when
the asymmetry is high (β > 1 + 2γ), the manufacturer and retailer interests align
and the retailer finds it profitable to push product 1 to its customers. The results on
product variety, retailer’s selling format choice and profit sharing in the channel in
equilibrium are summarized in Proposition 13.
Proposition 13. In equilibrium,
• when the asymmetry between products is not too high (β ≤ 1 + 2γ),
– the retailer follows the mediated access selling format when γ ≤ γ3 or when
β > β1 and the direct access selling format otherwise.
– the manufacturer reduces product variety when γ > γ3 & β > β1 and offers
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full product variety otherwise,
– the manufacturer partly shares the extra surplus generated by the mediated
access retailer when it offers full product variety.
• when the asymmetry between products is high (β > 1 + 2γ),
– the retailer chooses mediated access selling format,
– the manufacturer offers full product variety,
– the manufacturer shares the extra surplus generated by the mediated access
retailer as if it were picking the product to be pushed.
where γ3 =

q

(3−β)2 (1+3θ+2θ2 )
+(β−2)(1+θ)−θ
2

q
and β1 = 1−2γ+ 2(1+2θ)(1+γ(γ−2+16cγ(1+θ))
.
1+θ

To summarize, the results are qualitatively very similar to the base model when
the asymmetry between the products is not too high. I plot the equilibrium selling
formats and product variety with respect to γ and θ in Figure 13. Similar to the base
model, when the retailer’s influence γ is low, the retailer adopts the mediated access
selling format and the manufacturer offers full product variety. When γ is high, the
retailer adopts mediated access selling format but the manufacturer reduces product
variety to a single product. Otherwise, the retailer adopts the direct access selling
format and the manufacturer offers full product variety.
Unlike before, even when the asymmetry is low, the manufacturer is able to extract
some portion of the extra surplus that is generated in the channel by the retailer’s
ability to selectively push products to customers. However, the amount of surplus
that it extracts is lesser than what the manufacturer would have been able to extract
if it were to pick the product to be pushed to the consumers. On the other hand,
when the asymmetry between products is high, as discussed earlier, the incentives
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Figure 13: Selling Formats and Product Variety in Equilibrium with asymmetric
products plotted with retailer’s level of influence over product demands γ, and the
substitutability between the two products θ (for c = 0.02 and β = 1.05).
of the manufacturer and the retailer align and the manufacturer shares the extra
surplus generated in the channel as if it were picking the product to be pushed to the
consumers.
4.4.2. Endogenizing Retailer’s Ability to Selectively Influence Product Demands
Until now, we had assumed that the retailer’s ability to selectively influence product
demands is fixed and exogenous. In this section, I allow the retailer to choose the level
of influence it has on the product demands. As before, the retailer builds the amount
of influence by investing in it, incurring a cost cγ 2 that is quadratic in the level of
this influence. For example, traditional retailers in emerging markets can increase
their level of influence by putting more effort into building better relationships with
their customers. I assume that there is an upper limit to the level of influence that
the retailer can acquire given by γ̄. I assume that γ̄ < 1/2 to ensure meaningful
competition between the two products.
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The timing of the game is as follows. In Stage 1, the retailer decides its selling
format, In Stage 2, the manufacturer decides to offer either one or both products
to the retailer, in Stage 3, it sets the wholesale prices for the offered product(s), in
Stage 4, the retailer chooses the level of influence γ, in Stage 5 the retailer decides
which product to selectively push to its customers and in Stage 6, it sets the retail
prices for the offered product(s). I solve the game by backward induction to derive
the sub-game perfect equilibrium.
Proposition 14. Under the mediated access selling format, in the case where the
manufacturer offers two products to the retailer, when the quadratic investment cost
coefficient is low, c < c1 , the retailer invests maximally in its ability to selectively
push one of the products offered by the retailer, setting γ to γ̄. But when the cost
coefficient is high the retailer sets γ to 0 in equilibrium. Where c1 =

1
.
2+4θ

When the investment cost coefficient is low, the profit function for the retailer is
increasing in γ, making it optimal for the retailer to maximally invest in it, setting
it to γ̄. When the investment cost coefficient is high, the retailer’s profit function
has a maximum with respect to γ that is equal to 0 in equilibrium. The intuition
behind this result is that the retailer’s profit making ability from γ is curtailed by the
manufacturer’s strategy to set the two wholesale prices to be the same, rendering it
infeasible to invest in it when the cost is high.
Proposition 15. Under the mediated access selling format, in the case where the
manufacturer offers one product to a retailer, when the quadratic investment cost
coefficient is low, c < c2 , the retailer invests maximally in its ability to selectively push
one of the products offered by the retailer, setting γ to γ̄. But when the cost coefficient
is high, it sets γ to an interior maximum,

2θ+1
.
8c(2θ2 +3θ+1)−2
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Where c2 =

1+2θ+γ̄
.
8γ̄(1+3θ+4θ2 )

The intuition behind this result is that when the manufacturer offers a single product
to the retailer, its incentives align with the retailer, hence the manufacturer sets the
wholesale prices such that the retailer finds it optimal to have a non-zero γ even when
the cost is high.
In equilibrium, all the results in the base model continue to hold true in terms of the
upper limit γ̄ when c < c2 < c1 . That is, the retailer follows the mediated access
selling format either when γ̄ ≤ γ̄1 or when γ̄ > γ̄2 & c < 1/(8 + 16θ). Otherwise, the
retailer follows the direct access format. The manufacturer reduces product variety,
offering only one product to the retailer when γ̄ > γ̄2 & c < 1/(8 + 16θ). Where
√
1
.
γ̄1 = 2 + 6θ + 4θ2 − 1 − 2θ and γ̄2 = √
1+

2(1+θ)(1/(1+2θ)−8c)

When c2 < c < c1 , the retailer adopts mediated access selling format when γ̄ <
√
√
c(4θ+2)− 2−4c(2θ+1)
√
and adopts direct access otherwise. The manufacturer offers full
4 c(4c(2θ2 +3θ+1)−1)
product variety in this case. When c > c1 , the manufacturer always provides full
product variety and the retailer adopts the mediated access selling format but sets γ
to zero.

4.5. Conclusions and Discussion
In this chapter, I develop a theory of selling formats studying manufacturer-retailer
interactions upstream in the channel. Specifically, I investigate the effect of a mediated access retailer’s ability to selectively influence product demands on the product
variety that the manufacturer offers and on profit sharing within the channel. In
modeling this, I also study the retailer’s selling format decision between mediated
and direct access formats.
I find that the mediated access retailer’s ability to selectively push products to its customers along with its ability to choose which of the products to push, affords it some
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bargaining power over the manufacturer. As a result, when the manufacturer offers
full product variety, the retailer is able to fully extract the extra surplus generated
in the channel by its ability. When this ability is high, in response, the manufacturer
handicaps the retailer by reducing product variety, in order to share the extra surplus
generated in the channel. In certain cases, when the retailer’s ability is medium, the
retailer actually prefers to handicap itself by switching to the direct access selling
format in order to ensure that the manufacturer offers full product variety.
These results provide another explanation for why traditional retailers, contrary to
widely made predictions, have been able to survive the advent of large organized
retailers like Auchan and Walmart in several emerging markets. The model results
show that traditional retailers, by virtue of their mediated access selling format, have
some bargaining power over the manufacturer which allows them to extract higher
profits. The results are also consistent with several real-world observations about
selling formats, for instance, direct access retailers carry larger assortment sizes and
serve a larger customer base as compared to retailers that employ the mediated access
selling format.
I conclude by discussing some limitations of the model studied in this chapter and
laying out potential avenues for future work. One of the limitations is that the model
does not allow for competition between manufacturers. In this chapter, I focus on
studying the interactions between a single manufacturer and retailer. This allows us to
cleanly derive insights into the manufacturer’s product variety decision in response to
the retailer’s chosen selling format. The key insights about a manufacturer’s product
variety decision and profit sharing within the channel should continue to hold even
when we incorporate competing manufacturers as long as the competition does not
drive that manufacturer out of market. Another limitation of the model is that it
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does not allow for competition between retailers that might employ different selling
formats. The main insights developed in this chapter should continue to hold when
retailers are competing with each other as the ability of a mediated access retailer
to selectively recommend a product over others should continue to provide it some
bargaining power over the manufacturer even with competing retailers. However, it
would be interesting to develop further insights by modeling competition in future
work. For example, would manufacturers supply different products to different types
of retailers and if so, under what conditions and what types of products would they
supply mediated access vs direct access retailers.

78

CHAPTER 5 : Conclusion
In this dissertation, I develop a theory for different selling formats used by retailers
worldwide, characterized by the different degrees to which customers can access and
inspect products in store. In the direct access selling format, all available products
are stocked on shelves directly accessible to customers for inspection, while store associates offer minimal assistance. On the other hand, in the mediated access selling
format, access to products is mediated by a store associate who offers products one at
a time to customers and the customers decide whether to purchase an offered product
or to ask for an alternative. The direct access selling format strongly dominates in developed economies and the mediated access selling format has historically dominated
in emerging economies. However, the retailing landscape in emerging markets has
changed over the last couple of decades with a number of multinational companies
entering these markets. As a result, both direct access and mediated access selling
formats coexist in significant measure in emerging markets today with the direct access selling format being popular in the modern organized retailing sector, primarily
in urban areas, while the mediated access selling format continues to be dominant in
the traditional unorganized retailing sector, in both urban and rural areas.
It was widely presumed that the arrival of large organized retailers would lead to the
demise of traditional retailers in emerging markets. However, these predictions have
been proved wrong; traditional retailing continues to thrive in many emerging markets
like India, Indonesia and Philippines. In this dissertation, I investigate the role of
selling formats in the resilience of traditional retailing in emerging markets despite the
advent of large organized retailers in these markets. I find that the mediated access
selling format affords traditional retailers certain advantages in their interactions with
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both consumers as well as manufacturers, that allow them to make higher profits and
carry a smaller assortment size, helping them survive in emerging markets.
In the first essay of this dissertation, I focus on understanding and modeling the
interactions between a retailer and its customers in direct vs mediated access selling
formats. To this end, I develop a theoretical model to study a retailer’s selling format,
product assortment and pricing decisions when consumers have different levels of
uncertainty for different products and have time costs of shopping. I study two
types of products, the general purpose brand provides certain and uniform fit to all
consumers while the specialized brand provides ex ante uncertain fit to consumers
which can be resolved upon inspection.
I find that the retailer’s selling format decision is based on how costly it chooses to
make it for a consumer to determine her match with the specialized product, that
is, whether it chooses to internalize the cost associated with this (by adopting the
direct access selling format) or transfers this cost to the consumer (by adopting the
mediated access selling format). This decision is, in turn, affected by consumers’
match uncertainty with the specialized brand. The retailer chooses the mediated
access selling format when the uncertainty of match value with the specialized brand
is either high or low, and chooses the direct access selling format when this uncertainty
is medium (as long as the margin on the general purpose brand is not too high).
The model also allows us to derive results on the assortment size carried by retailers
and on what type of products a mediated access retailer should offer first. I find
that the retailer carries a smaller assortment size (carrying only the general purpose
brand) under the mediated access selling format when the uncertainty associated with
the specialized brand is low. When the uncertainty associated with the specialized
brand is high, the mediated access retailer carries both brands and prefers to offer
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the specialized brand first. The results show that mediated access can allow retailers
to make higher profits and also suffice with a smaller assortment size, providing
an explanation for why traditional retailers that employ the mediated access selling
format have been able to survive in emerging markets despite the advent of organized
retailing in these markets.
The model results also help explain a number of other observations about the selling
format choice of retailers. Large organized retailers are able to bargain for deeper
discounts from manufacturers which small unorganized retailers may not be able to do.
According to the model, this will induce the former to choose the direct access format
and the latter the mediated access format. This offers an explanation for why in
emerging markets we observe that large organized retailers and retail chains typically
employ the direct access format while small unorganized retailers typically employ
the mediated access format. Furthermore, logistical and scale advantages enjoyed
by organized retailers allow them to reduce the costs of setting up, maintaining and
running the stores in the direct access selling format. This, however, is expensive for
individuals and families, who typically run unorganized stores, explaining why they
prefer to adopt the mediated access selling format instead. We also observe that the
direct access format is more popular in developed economies and in urban areas in
emerging economies. This may be because in developed economies and in urban areas
in emerging economies customers’ shopping costs are larger which, according to the
model, induces the retailers to prefer the direct access format. The results from the
model are also consistent with various observations about the different store formats,
for instance, direct access stores carry larger assortments than mediated access stores,
have lower prices and serve a larger clientele.
In the second essay of this dissertation, I develop a theory of selling formats studying
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manufacturer-retailer interactions upstream in the channel. Specifically, I investigate the effect of a mediated access retailer’s ability to selectively influence product
demands on the product variety that the manufacturer offers and on profit sharing
within the channel. In modeling this, I also study the retailer’s selling format decision
between mediated and direct access formats.
I find that the mediated access retailer’s ability to selectively push products to its customers along with its ability to choose which of the products to push, affords it some
bargaining power over the manufacturer. As a result, when the manufacturer offers
full product variety, the retailer is able to fully extract the extra surplus generated
in the channel by its ability. When this ability is high, in response, the manufacturer
handicaps the retailer by reducing product variety, in order to share the extra surplus
generated in the channel. In certain cases, when the retailer’s ability is medium, the
retailer actually prefers to handicap itself by switching to the direct access selling
format in order to ensure that the manufacturer offers full product variety.
These results provide another explanation for why traditional retailers, contrary to
widely made predictions, have been able to survive the advent of large organized retailers like Auchan and Walmart in several emerging markets. The results show that
mediated access affords traditional retailers some bargaining power over the manufacturer which allows them to extract higher profits. Hence, traditional retailers, by
virtue of their mediated access selling format, have certain advantages in their interactions with both consumers as well as manufacturers which can help them survive
in emerging markets.
I conclude with a discussion of some limitations of the models considered in this dissertation and directions for future work. One of the limitations is that we do not
allow for competition between retailers with potentially different selling formats. In
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the first essay of this dissertation, this has the effect of not allowing us to study consumers’ store choice when they have access to stores with different selling formats.
Instead, I allow consumers to have an outside option when deciding whether to visit
a retailer or not which allows us to study the effect of selling format choice on overall demand. Hence, the main insights developed in the first essay should transfer
to when we have retailers competing with each other. Similarly, the main insights
developed in the second essay should continue to hold when retailers are competing
with each other, as the ability of a mediated access retailer to selectively recommend
products should continue to provide it some bargaining power over the manufacturer
even with competing retailers. Another limitations of the model in the second essay
is that it does not allow for competition between manufacturers. I focus on studying
the interactions between a single manufacturer and retailer. This allows us to cleanly
derive insights into the manufacturer’s product variety decision in response to the
retailer’s chosen selling format. The key insights about a manufacturer’s product
variety decision and profit sharing within the channel should continue to hold even
when we incorporate competing manufacturers as long as the competition does not
drive that manufacturer out of market. It would be interesting to develop further
insights by modeling competition in future work. For example, would manufacturers
supply different products to different types of retailers and if so, under what conditions, and what types of products would they supply to mediated access vs direct
access retailers.
Another avenue for future work would be to empirically test some of the findings
of the models considered in this dissertation. I identify a few empirically testable
hypotheses that would provide a good test of validity for these models:
• H1: The ratio of retail prices of specialized and general purpose brands (pS /pG )
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is higher under mediated access as compared to direct access.
• H2: Market share of the specialized brand is higher under mediated access as
compared to direct access.
• H3: Controlling for store size, product variety is lesser in mediated access as
compared to direct access.
These hypotheses are counterintuitive in the sense that both the price and the market
share of the specialized brand are predicted to be higher under mediated access under
the model. This is the case because mediated access allows the retailer to offer the
specialized brand first and also allows the retailer to take advantage of consumers’
shopping costs to charge a higher price for it. Together with the prediction of reduced
product variety under mediated access, these set of hypotheses should provide a good
test of validity for the models considered in this dissertation.
Lastly, another avenue for future work would be to explore other contexts where products are presented to consumers sequentially instead of simultaneously. For example,
sets of products are presented sequentially to consumers in online retailing, which is
similar to the mediated access selling formats studied in a physical setting in this
dissertation. It would be interesting, in future work, to study how these sets are constructed when consumers have different levels of uncertainty for different products.
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